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The recent Arab Spring movement in the Middle East and North Africa has been heralded as 
a transition to democracy for a region plagued by authoritarian regimes and their durable 
leaders. This paper seeks to understand why Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's former long-time 
president, was forced from office during the early months of 2011. Influenced by recent work 
in political scholarship on the Middle East, the Post-democratisation paradigm, seeks to 
escape from the democratisation paradigm. Instead of viewing events as indicative of 
inevitable democratisation in the region, the paper attempts to explain events in terms of 
Skocpol's structural approach to revolution which can also be used to understand significant 
social change. In line with the structural approach the paper provides a contextual and 
narrative history of Egyptian politics, including opposition and protests, as a backdrop to the 
events between the 25th of January and the 11th of February 2011 which led to Hosni 
Mubarak leaving office. The paper exhibits structural contradictions in the Mubarak regime, 
some of which would lead to tension in the elite. Specifically, it highlights tension between 
the military and the Mubaraks over the matter of Gamal Mubarak's apparent succession of his 
father. This explains why the military would not use coercive force to help maintain 
Mubarak's power. It found that the social movement #January25 was  successful at 























Table of Contents 
Figures.................................................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1: Egypt‘s Arab Spring ................................................................................................. 9 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 9 
Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian State ............................................................................... 11 
Research question ................................................................................................................ 12 
Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 13 
Delimitations and Limitations .............................................................................................. 13 
The Arab Spring ................................................................................................................... 14 
The January 25th uprising, a narrative ................................................................................. 15 
Figure 1: Map of Tahrir Square and surrounding areas ................................................... 16 
In Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 21 
Chapter 2: Introducing the Conceptual Approach ................................................................... 24 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 24 
Structure vs. Agency ............................................................................................................ 24 
Theories of Social Change and Revolution ......................................................................... 25 
The Structural Approach ...................................................................................................... 30 
The state ............................................................................................................................... 32 
The Remaining Principles .................................................................................................... 34 
Stages of Social Revolution ................................................................................................. 37 
Elite unity and the stability of regimes ................................................................................ 40 
Critiques of Skocpol‘s Structural Approach ........................................................................ 43 
Appropriateness of the Structural Approach ........................................................................ 45 
In conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 48 
Chapter 3: Historical Narrative of Egypt‘s Political Landscape .............................................. 50 
The Colonial Context and establishment of the Modern state ............................................. 50 
From Nasser to Mubarak ..................................................................................................... 53 
Political Themes................................................................................................................... 53 
Society and Economy .......................................................................................................... 57 
Foreign policy ...................................................................................................................... 62 
In conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 65 
Chapter 4: History of opposition movements, protests/collective actions, the #January25th 
movement and events leading to the fall of Mubarak .............................................................. 66 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 66 
Strikes and collective actions, a brief history ...................................................................... 66 















Secular civil society: the emergence of Kefaya and beyond ............................................... 67 
The Muslim Brotherhood ..................................................................................................... 72 
Events leading up to the #January25th Uprising ................................................................. 74 
In conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 75 
Chapter 5: Factors in the Literature ......................................................................................... 77 
MENA Region Regime Weakness ....................................................................................... 77 
The Military and Gamal Mubarak ....................................................................................... 79 
The role played by social and digital media ........................................................................ 79 
Youth unemployment and demographic bulge .................................................................... 82 
Anger, Unchecked Power, Corruption, Labour Practices and Land .................................... 83 
In conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 85 
Chapter 6: Analysis and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 86 
State Crisis ........................................................................................................................... 86 
External pressures ................................................................................................................ 87 
Break in the elite: succession crisis ..................................................................................... 90 
The military as final guarantor ............................................................................................. 93 
Explaining the military's decision not to support the regime ............................................... 95 
'Urban uprising': a crisis from below ................................................................................... 99 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 101 



































Chapter 1: Egypt’s Arab Spring 
Introduction 
 
In late 2010 and early 2011 the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), witnessed 
unprecedented social protest against corrupt authoritarian governments. Some of these 
movements morphed into more serious rebellions, which have been termed revolutions by 
some (in the case of Egypt), and others have led to serious civil conflicts (in the case of 
Syria). Regardless of the future outcomes for the region, the ‗Arab Spring‘, as these 
movements have cumulatively been termed, provides a number of fascinating questions for 
social and political scientists.  
 
The aim of this paper is to understand unrest in Egypt in early 2011. Hosni Mubarak, Egypt‘s 
president for nearly 30 years, was pushed from power during the 'Egyptian uprising' from the 
25th of January to the 11th of February 2011. In light of the fact that opposition to his 
leadership, and questions about the legitimacy thereof, were not new, what made the period 
in early 2011 different? How can we understand the outcome of Egypt‘s experience of the 
Arab Spring? Related to this is the aim to understand why Egypt's military acted as it did? 
Unlike experiences in other MENA countries it did not act against demonstrators and failed 





This paper argues that Hosni Mubarak lost power due to a state crisis emanating from 
tensions between the elite and the state. Specifically relationship between the military, a state 
institution, and the regime elite was strained, which affected its disposition to prop up 
Mubarak. 
 
                                                 
1
 Nathan Brown, ―Egypt's Revolution Stumbles Forward,‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 


















To understand these events this paper will break-away from much of the literature on MENA 
politics by adopting a structural as opposed to a democratisation approach
2
. This approach, 
which is state-centred, places emphasis on relations between different groups within states 
and relations between states in the international system. Structural conditions and social 
relations in Egypt are explored in order to shed light on the events in question. It is not yet 
clear what the outcome of Egypt‘s experience of the ‗Arab Spring‘ will be, this is one of the 
reasons a structural approach is such a useful paradigm for understanding the events that led 
to the fall of Mubarak. The structural approach‘s emphasis on macro-structures allows for an 
understanding of how state crisis and upheaval from below can lead to significant social 
change in a society without being hinged on the end outcome. That is, what lies in Egypt‘s 
future is not necessary for a structural approach explaining the state crisis and upheaval from 
below that led to Mubarak‘s fall. 
 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to understanding the Arab Spring and specifically the 
abovementioned events in Egypt. A short description of Hosni Mubarak and Egypt as a state 
with its associated political system is provided to emphasise why his loss of power and the 
‗Egyptian uprising‘ itself are interesting to understand. This paper‘s specific research 
question and its methodology are then discussed. A brief description of the Arab Spring 
follows. Egypt‘s specific experience is then highlighted. A narrative account of the events 
from the 25
th
 of January to the 11
th
 of February is given.  
 
                                                 
2
 Structural approaches are generally employed in the study of revolution. The structural approach in this paper 
will draw mainly on Theda Skocpol‘s structural approach which is the most prominent and recognised. This 
paper does not view or claim the recent events in Egypt amount to revolution. Also it is far from clear that what 
happened in Egypt amounts to ‗a complete structural overhaul of political and social institutions‘. However the 
events that led to, as well as the actual overthrow/resignation of Hosni Mubarak, do indicate significant change 
for Egypt. There also seem to be elements of class involved in protests against rising inequality between rich 
and poor, corruption and dropping standards of living coupled with massive scale labour actions. Furthermore 
the events have been referred to, both by international media and protesters, as a revolution which signifies that 
the general consensus that the events are viewed as amounting to some serious form of change. This paper 
recognises the usefulness of the structural approach in analysis of said occurrences, which can be considered as 
substantial, rapid change to Egypt‘s political institutions with some elements of class upheaval. For more 
information on her definition see:  Theda Skocpol, ―France, Russia and China: A Structural Analysis of Social 















Hosni Mubarak and the Egyptian State 
 
Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981 after then President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. 
There was, at the time, the perception that Mubarak, who was vice-president, had come to 
power by chance not selection as he was not elected President but rather inherited the 
position through Sadat‘s assassination
3
. Mubarak served as President of Egypt for nearly 30 
years until he was unseated on the 11
th
 of February 2011. His long incumbency was not 
without opposition or protest from Egyptians. During the 1980‘s he managed to cement his 
power and that of the National Democratic Party‘s (NDP)
4
 by for example using extended 
state of emergency laws. 
 
 In the last decade there has increasingly been resistance to the idea of continued rule by 
Mubarak, and especially to the notion that his son Gamal would succeed him. The sentiments 
expressed during protests in early 2011 were by no means new.  
 
Mubarak was able to maintain his position for so long because of Egypt‘s political system. 
Technically Egypt was an authoritarian non-competitive multi-party state. The NDP was 
created in the 1970‘s after Sadat liberalised the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
5
. Although there 
are other parties which are allowed to compete in elections, due to election rigging, unfair 
legislation and coercive force, the NDP maintained its position as the most dominant party in 
the system with no serious competition, thus making the system multi-party but non-
competitive
6
. More specifically, Egypt has a presidential system which grants broad 
executive power to the president, allowing Mubarak the necessary coercive powers to keep 
his position despite opposition.  
 
While there is space for government-controlled opposition parties, Egypt under Mubarak was 
considered to be a hybrid system of ‗authoritarian upgrading‘
7
 which refers to autocrats 
reacting to developments in their socio-economic environments by forming policies which 
                                                 
3
 Ann M. Lesch, ―Egypt‘s Spring: Causes of the Revolution,‖ Middle East Policy, XVIII: 3(2011), 35. 
4
 The NDP was Egypt‘s most prominent political party, which Mubarak was the leader of and is discussed in 
detail in chapter 3 
5
 The ASU was the state party and is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
6
 Holgar Albrecht, ―How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt,‖ Democratisation, 
12:.3 (2005), 383. 
7















ensure the stability of authoritarian rule
8
. The extension of the state of emergency from 
Sadat‘s assassination is an example of this. Opposition parties were allowed in order to 




In more conceptual terms Jack Goldstone has described the Egyptian state at the time in 
question as being a ‗sultanistic dictatorship‘. By this he means that though it seems 
invulnerable to social upheaval and protest, it is in reality weak because of the above 
mentioned methods and structures the regime has used to stay in power. Other key features of 
this form of regime are a single dictator with a close circle of elite. They usually extend their 




With the above regime typology in mind, it becomes more apparent why Mubarak‘s fall from 
power is so interesting. He had managed to stay in power for nearly 3 decades, at the expense 
of the Egyptian population and state institutions. Understanding how this came to be has 
important ramifications for the region. If other states fit this ‗sultanistic‘ description, they 
may also be vulnerable to state crisis and upheaval from below.  
 
The next section lays out the research question of this paper as well as the methodology 
employed and the recognised limitations. This is followed by a brief description of the Arab 
Spring which helps to locate the Egyptian experience in its regional context. 
 
Research question 
   
How does the structuralist approach explain the fall of Mubarak, including the role of the 
military in contributing to this outcome? 
 
A secondary question is: How did the #January25 Movement come to be and sustain itself 
throughout the abovementioned time period? 
 
                                                 
8
 Paul Aarts, Pieter van Dijke, Iris Kolman, Jort Statema and Ghassan Damman, From Resilience to  
Revolt. Making sense of the Arab Spring, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research 





 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012, 3-4. 
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The conceptual approach used is derived from structural approaches to revolution and 
significant social change. It draws heavily on Theda Skocpol's work in States and Social 
Revolution as her work is considered the most prominent and developed among structural 
approaches
11
. In short, the structural approach requires the researcher to focus on the 
structures and relationships of the state both domestically and internationally, in a non-
voluntarist
12
 way in order to explain significant social change. This framework has been 
supplemented with elite theory from a number of authors. This is done to clarify and expand 
Skocpol‘s notion that division within the ruling elite can be a cause of state crisis. 
Specifically, the concept of elite unity is important because it lends understanding to the 
conditions under which tensions form and elites tend to fracture.  
 
It also relies on the body of previous research studies and published academic literature on 
Egypt's general and political history. This has been used to build a narrative of the state and 
its structures, as well as its relationships domestically and internationally (among other 
structural conditions which may play an explanatory role). This is discussed in detail in 
chapter 2. It also relies on journalistic commentary where applicable to demonstrate the 
sequence of events or public opinion at the time. The aim is to understand the factors which 
led to state crisis and upheaval from below, which helps explain Mubarak‘s fall from power. 
 
Delimitations and Limitations 
 
Although every effort to include relevant information and voices in the discussion about 
Egypt has been made, some limitations exist. This paper specifically investigates the events 
between the 25th of January and the 11th of February 2011 which led to the resignation of 
long-time president Hosni Mubarak. A structural approach requires detailed historical and 
contextual background. Thus, a brief history of Egypt from Ottoman domination through 
British colonisation to the events beginning on the 25
th
 of January 2011 is provided. This is 
imperative to locate key structural contradictions in the regime. Due to space constraints 
                                                 
11
 This paper recognises that there are many approaches to the study of political change/violence and revolution, 
the structural one has been chosen in this paper as most appropriate to address the research questions. The 
choice vis a vie other approaches will be discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
.
12
 The causes of social change are viewed as emanating from structural conditions in the state rather than as a 















events after the 11th of February will not be analysed; they are also not necessary for an 
analysis of state crisis and upheaval from below which resulted in Mubarak‘s downfall. 
 
In terms of limitations this paper has firstly been constrained by the fact that the events being 
studied are so recent.  There is a small rapidly growing literature on Egypt's experience of the 
Arab Spring. This has had a few implications for this study. Firstly, new literature has not 
always been readily available. Secondly, the literature is constantly growing and changing. 
This paper attempts to include the bulk of relevant literature while recognising it may not be 
possible to include every voice in the discussion on the Arab Spring. 
The Arab Spring 
 
This section explains the unrest/protest movements in the MENA region which have become 
collectively known as the Arab Spring. In late 2010 a young street vendor in Tunisia set 
himself alight to protest police corruption and brutality. His actions sparked widespread 
protests in that country, which eventually led to the end of long-time President Ben Ali‘s rule. 
This served to inspire citizens across the MENA region to begin movements of their own 
against their long-term authoritarian regimes. Protest movements were often organised 
through the use of social media sites like Twitter and Facebook as well as social media 
sharing platforms like Flickr and Youtube. The most significant changes thus far have been 
seen in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya where, to varying extents, there has been regime change. 
There is an on-going civil conflict in Syria which has led to massive causalities. Bahrain, 
Yemen, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, among others, have also experienced unrest
13
.With this in 
                                                 
13
 While regimes benefiting from petrodollars have fared better in the Arab Spring, due to their ability to pay off 
the populace, the assertion that the military in these countries would ensure stability has shown divergent 
outcomes. Gause argues countries in which the military is a strong institution it will side with protestors, such as 
in Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt and Tunisia are homogenous societies (Sunni). Military leaders would foresee role 
for their institutions under new dispensations and so be more open to change. In countries like Libya and Yemen 
the military is closely linked with the ruling family and far less institutionalised. Another factor is whether or 
not the government represented the majority or was composed of a minority ethnic/religious group. In countries 
like Bahrain and Syria, the regime is minority led. In Bahrain Sunni led security forces backed the Sunni 
Monarchy in a country which is predominantly Shiite. Similarly in Syria the military is led by Alawite and other 
minority officers in a Sunni majority country. Gregory, F. Gause, III., "Why Middle East studies missed the 
















mind, a discussion of Egypt‘s experience of the Arab Spring is useful. The next section 
focuses on a narrative of the events between the 25
th
 of January and the 11
th
 of February 
2011. 
 
The January 25th uprising, a narrative 
 
Demonstrations in Egypt on the 25th of January 2011 were initially planned to protest police 
brutality and call for emergency law to be lifted, ironically to be held on the national holiday, 
Police Day. The protest occurred just after the events in Tunisia which led President Ben Ali 
to step down. Importantly, those close to Mubarak did not predict there would be any kind of 
substantial turn out for the Police Day protest
14
. On the first day, January 25th 2011, the 
crowd in Tahrir Square Cairo was about 80,000 strong
15
. During the initial days of 
demonstration, state TV completely ignored the protests. An anonymous NDP official 
admitted that this had been purposeful
16
. The regime believed if it ignored protests they 
would dissipate.  
 
During the first day, activists had managed to warn one another of the police's whereabouts 
and tactics. They had also managed to arrange forms of flash mobs, clashing with police in 
one area, dispersing and then regrouping somewhere else, using social media especially 
Facebook and Twitter. By the end of the day, security forces used a strong show to push 




                                                                                                                                                        
 
14
 Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: from Nasser to Tahrir Square, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 281-282. 
15
 Merylyna Lim, ―Clicks, Cabs and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-
2011,‖ Journal of Communication, 62 (2012): 243. 
16
 Dina Ezzat, ―NDP Promises Accommodation,‖ Al-Ahram Weekly, January 27th to February 2nd, accessed 
September 23
rd
 2012, weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1033/eg7.htm 
17




















The next two days saw dramatic increases in the level of participation. Cook estimates that it 
is possible that up to a million people were involved in protests in 7 of Egypt's 29 governates. 
This included many thousands in Tahrir Square, tens of thousands in Alexandria (Egypt's 







27 January the government blacked out Short Message Service (SMS) networks and 
almost all internet access. The internet was not restored until the 2
nd
 of February and SMS 
networks only on the 6
th
. Protesters circumvented these restrictions by using Google‘s 




                                                 
18
 Map taken from Andrew Barr, ―Map: Thousands of protesters gather in Cairo‘s Tahrir Square,‖  National 
Post,  February 1
st








 Alexandra Dunn, ―Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt‘s January 25
th
 Uprising,‖ The 















Protesters dubbed Friday the 28th the Day of Rage. It was a significant day as more sectors of 
society joined the protests, including businessmen, professors and government workers. 
Protesters attempted to take control of the Ministry of the Interior, resulting in three deaths. It 
also led to the surprise torching of the ruling NDP offices in Cairo. It was at this point that the 
crumbling security forces gave way to the military at Mubarak's command. This was a clear 




Although the Muslim Brotherhood
22
 initially refused to join the protests, many of its 
members joined as individuals. It was also invaluable in supporting the uprisings in terms of 
its established networks of social services. It is important to remember that these services 
were provided in the context of the withdrawal of the state from service provision
23
. The 
movement also benefitted from the knowledge and experience of Cairo's militant soccer 




Early in the morning on Sunday the 30th, Mubarak gave a televised speech, his first since the 
protests had begun. In his address Mubarak offered a national dialogue and a commitment to 
reform. He appealed to Egyptians nationalism urging citizen's not to let the country fall into 
instability. Later that day he dissolved the government and named Omar Suleiman the Vice-




The regime had blamed foreign influences and the Muslim Brotherhood for the protests, in 
reality the Brotherhood only officially joined protests on the Day of Rage
26
. Doaa El-Bay, a 
writer for Al-Ahram, commented two weeks later that state run media had fabricated and 
outright lied in this regard, spreading stories of foreign infiltration in demonstrations and 
blaming the Brotherhood. According to El-Bay all state-owned media either completely 
ignored what was happening with the protests, or ran stories that intimidated the public about 
                                                 
21
 Cook, The Struggle, 284-285. 
22
 Egypt‘s primary opposition party, discussed in detail in chapter 5 
23
 The Egyptian state‘s withdrawal from social service provision is discussed in chapter 3 and 4 
24
 Lim, ―Clicks, Cabs,‖ 243. and Mona El-Ghobashy, ―The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution,‖ Middle East 
Report, (2011), accessed 30 October 2012, stealthishijab.com/2011/05/31/the-praxis-of-the-egyptian-revolution/ 
25
 Cook, The Struggle, 285-286. 
26
 Aljazeera, ―Timeline: Egypt's Revolution: A chronicle of the revolution that ended the three decade long 


















. At the same time the rest of the world, and those who had access to 
satellite networks, watched as almost every notable news agency reported on the uprising. 
Aljazeera notably covered the events from start to finish. 
 
The military intervention, for the most part, did restore order without having to resort to 
violence. Even though they had been a key pillar in the maintenance of the regime and 
Mubarak's power, they had also been in the background of the political life for the last 30 or 




Feeling the pressure of the demonstrations, Mubarak addressed the crowds again in a 
televised speech on February 1st. This speech reiterated many of the points made in his first 
address but added more detail regarding planned modifications to article 76 and 77 of the 
constitution dealing with presidential candidacy.  He would also not seek re-election
29
. 
However the #January25 protesters were not appeased by this announcement and within just 
hours had begun to clash with pro-regime 'loyalists'. It was reported that the loyalists had in 
fact been paid by the NDP to attack protesters
30
. Violence on the part of the Mubarak regime 
was mainly perpetrated by government loyalists and 'thugs'. These groups mobilised in Cairo 
and Alexandria specifically and attacked the pro-democracy #January25 protesters with 




While the military was not directly involved in any violence against protesters, it also did 
little to prevent situations in which citizens were being attacked by government loyalists. The 
military had been deployed in Cairo and Alexandria by the 3rd of February, at which point a 
100 civilians had been injured in clashes, and yet for the most part they stood by as the 
clashes occurred. While the military had not until this point been involved in violent action 
against protesters, on the morning of the 3
rd
 of February, military police had raided human 
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 Cook, The Struggle, 286-287. 
29
 Ibid, 287. 
30
 Bahey al-Din Hassan, Neil Hicks and Michelle Dunne, ―Egypt on the Brink,‖ Carnegie Endowment for 























Later on the 3rd continuing to the 4th, and in the wake of 5 deaths and hundreds of injuries, 
the military began to secure the area around Tahrir. Most were grateful for the increased 
security, but the checkpoints also meant fewer protesters could reach the Square. At the same 
time the newly appointed Vice-President, Omar Suleiman, was trying to organise 
negotiations with the Brotherhood and other opposition figures. This was seen by some as a 
sign of Mubarak standing by his promise to institute reform, others were sceptical that a 
figure like Suleiman, who had in the past been responsible for insuring the Brotherhood did 




The regime lead by Suleiman waited out the protests, by Monday the 7th it seemed as though 
they were losing momentum. On the 6th banks had reopened shortly for business and traffic 




Then two events occurred which changed the course of the uprising. Firstly, the Cairo 
University Law School issued a statement which supported those demonstrating across the 
country as well as their demands. As the state's security apparatus had long infiltrated the 
halls of all universities, and the Dean was a 'government functionary' the move was symbolic 
of one of the important regime support pillars falling. Secondly, activist and Google 
executive Wael Ghonim was released from police custody and appeared on a private channel 
called Dream where he gave an emotive interview. Ghonim was responsible for the 'We are 
all Khaled Said' Facebook page, and had been arrested on January 26th by Police near Tahrir. 
In his interview he appealed to citizens not to use the unrest as a time to settle scores but as 
one to build the country together, in contrast to Gamal Mubarak's sense of entitlement and 




There was speculation as to how it came about that Ghonim was released. One possibility is 
that security forces were attempting to appease the demonstrators; following what was 
happening on Twitter meant they knew the release of Ghonim was a key goal for the 
movement. Another theory is that there was serious discord within the NDP by this point and 
                                                 
33
 Cook, The Struggle, 288. 
34
 Aljazeera, ―Timeline‖ 
35
 Cook, The Struggle, 290-292. This seems to support the argument made in this paper that there were tensions 















that there was a sort of power struggle in what remained of the Mubarak power structure and 




Regardless of motivation, the effect was startling. It re-energised those demonstrating in 
Tahrir. Importantly it seemed to motivate different sectors of society to participate. Lawyers 
appeared at Tahrir in their robes, transport workers went on strike in Cairo and Suez. 
Workers were connecting their long felt economic woes to the corrupt and illegitimate 




By Thursday the 10th of February the notion that the regime would be able to get control of 
the demonstrations was no longer held by many. There were widespread reports that Mubarak 
would step down. However, when he appeared on television late that evening, his address 
made it clear that he envisioned himself as part of Egypt's political future. The response in 
Tahrir was one of rage. He had decided to only delegate Presidential power to his Vice-
President, Suleiman and not step down. What made matters worse was the fact that the 
transfer was only temporary and according to Article 84 of the constitution, Presidential 




This refusal to step down would ultimately be what pitted him against the army. As the 
crowds reacted to his refusal to step down, activists began planning a march to the 
Presidential palace. The military had blocked the approach and a march there would put the 
military in the position to have to make a choice about whether to support and maintain the 
regime by firing on thousands of protesters or to push Mubarak out of power
39
. Significantly, 
according to Aljazeera, the protesters in Tahrir demanded that the military join their cause 




The next morning on February the 11th, while hundreds of thousands of protesters remained 
in Tahrir Square, yet more marched along Salah Salim Street towards the towards Mubarak's 
compound. The military did not fire on the protesters or prevent their movement. At 6pm in 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, 291. 
37
 Ibid, 292-293. 
38
 Ibid, 294. 
39
 Ibid, 294. 
40















Cairo the Vice President appeared on state television and announced that Hosni Mubarak had 




On the 11th of February, before Mubarak stood down as President, there was speculation that 
it was becoming clear that the military was going to have to take a side. The military had, 
through a communiqué revealed that it would 'support the legitimate demands of the people' – 
this signalled a change from the past, according to Dunne, as the military did not engage in 
political commentary. There was commentary about what the response of the military would 
be if protesters were to, march on mass to the presidential residence and scale the walls. 
Demonstrators were gaining and not losing momentum, and this was increasingly putting the 




Mubarak stepped down on the 11th of February 2011. Ottoway suggests that his resignation 
came as a result of pressure by the Egyptian military. In essence she suggests that Mubarak 
was sacrificed in order to maintain the status quo, and at the time of his resignation, power 
had shifted to the military
43
. This view that the military was significantly involved in the 
resignation of Mubarak is one that is supported by Brown, who months later claimed that the 
military Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) had entered Egyptian politics just before 






This chapter has given a brief description of Hosni Mubarak, the former President of Egypt, 
as well as a description of the Egyptian political system during his rule. It has briefly 
described the Arab Spring and discussed its divergent outcomes and possible reasons for 
them. As the aim of the paper is to understand Egypt‘s experience of the Arab Spring, and 
how long-time President Mubarak was pushed from power, it then focussed on a narrative of 
Egypt‘s experience and the events in question. The above narratives/descriptions have 
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provided a foundational view of the events in question and are intended to contextualise the 
research question and the following chapters.  
 
The paper ultimately argues that Hosni Mubarak lost power because of a state crisis caused 
by tensions between the elite and the state. The relationship between the military, a state 
institution, and the regime was also strained, which affected its disposition to support 
Mubarak. Finally, this paper focuses on the #January25th movement as the product of waves 
of protest which have developed since 2000. They have used social media to network and co-
ordinate, as well as other societal or social networks which will be discussed in the coming 
chapters. 
 
The second chapter explains the structural approach, and provides a theoretical foundation for 
the paper. It discusses why other approaches, particularly democratisation, have not been 
employed. It also provides examples of how structural approaches have successfully 
explained the Iranian revolution, which is geographically and culturally similar to Egypt, thus 
providing useful lessons. 
 
The third chapter provides an in-depth historical narrative of Egypt‘s political landscape. It 
discusses the state and its structure, emphasising how the current system has developed over 
time. The chapter traces the origins of the elite during Mubarak‘s incumbency as well as 
other relevant social groups. It also assesses the relations between Egypt and other states, 
tracing its historical associations from the Ottomans, British to the United States (US) as well 
as discussing the impact of regional competition with Israel. This chapter provides the 
relevant historical and contextual background to apply structural analysis to the Egyptian 
case. 
 
The fourth chapter takes a more in-depth look at Egyptian opposition politics. It emphasises 
the recent history of collective actions against the regime as well as strikes which have had a 
political tone. It traces the emergence of a social movement called Kefaya, which was the 
predecessor of the #January 25
th
 movement responsible for protests in the period under 
examination. Finally, it traces the events which led to the ‗Egyptian uprising‘. 
 
The fifth chapter discusses factors in the literature which are considered either causal or in 















both structural factors and voluntarist factors. These factors are useful in explaining state 
crisis and urban uprising. 
 
The sixth and final chapter applies the structural approach to the internal and external 
relationships explored in chapters 3 to 5. Specifically it discusses the emergence of a ‗state 
crisis‘, in which Egyptian elites fractured and the disenfranchised military failed to back the 
president. It then discusses ‗upheaval from below‘ which details how protest movements 















Chapter 2: Introducing the Conceptual Approach 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the Arab Spring and Egypt‘s experience of it. With this 
context it introduced the research questions of the paper. This chapter is devoted to 
discussing the theoretical approach employed to address the research question. It begins with 
a discussion of the structure vs. agency debate in order to understand the different 
approaches/theories explaining significant social change and political violence. Then the 
chapter introduces these theories/approaches, specifically looking at why democratisation 
was rejected by this paper as a prism through which to view events. The structural approach 
is introduced, as well as a discussion about the centrality of the state to the approach, the 
principle underpinning it and finally the stages of revolution useful for the paper. A brief 
overview of elite theory is given as it is useful for understanding tensions in the elite and how 
they contribute to state crisis. Critiques of the approach are addressed to assess its usefulness 
and possible shortfalls. Finally the appropriateness of the structural approach in the Egyptian 
case is discussed once the conceptual approach itself has been clarified. 
 
Structure vs. Agency 
The structure vs. agency debate centres on whether political change occurs due to actors 
purposefully acting to achieve a goal, or whether structural factors and conditions lead to an 
inevitable outcome. 
 
 According to Mahoney and Snyder, the debate can be boiled down to the way each side 
views the effect of socialisation (structures) on human relations. The actor/voluntarist view is 
‗undersocialised‘, whereas the structural approach is ‗oversocialised‘. Voluntarists do not 
believe that human identity, behaviour or interests are formed by social structures. Human 
actions cannot be explained by external social relations. On the other hand, structuralists view 
human behaviour, interest formation and identity as a result of place in social structure and 




















This debate has been prominent in the literature on social/ political change and revolution. As 
the approach used in this paper is structural, this debate is useful to discuss. 
 
Theories of Social Change and Revolution 
 
The following section outlines the various perspectives on social change and revolution in 
order to provide sufficient background on which to form the theoretical approach of this 
paper.  
 
Marx and Engels‘ Manifesto of the Communist Party, is viewed to be one of the most 
influential pieces ever written on revolution. Marxism contends that the movement of history 
would inevitably lead to revolution, creating a communist society, transforming one mode of 
production to another, as members of exploited classes would overthrow the ruling class. The 
basic premises are that revolutions are related to historical transitions, progressive and 
beneficial, and finally that they would usher in capitalism followed by those which introduce 
socialism, as its benefits are more widely felt by all classes
46
. Marxism has proved to be less 
pertinent for Western societies
47
, although it remains a seminal work and is applicable in 
some ways to the former Soviet bloc countries and some ‗Third World‘ ones. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville published his book The Old Regime and the French Revolution in 1848 
at the same time as Marx and Engels‘ Manifesto. His view was complementary to theirs in 
that he agreed the aristocracy and feudal system had been destroyed by the French revolution. 
In contrast, he viewed this as part of strengthening a centralised state which now had 
dominion over all men, as everyone was now equal before the law
48
. As opposed to Marx and 
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Engels, de Tocqueville cautions that revolution may strengthen the state as opposed to being 




According to Goldstone there were 3 distinct periods of contemporary scholarship which 
followed. The first were the natural histories of the 1920's and 1930's which aimed to find 
patterns/events common among revolutions. While this approach did elicit valuable 
information it failed to answer basic questions like: what are the causes of revolution?  
 
The second period was dominated by general theories, including social psychological and 
system-disequilibrium explanations, of political violence in the 1960's and 70's
50
. The former 
focuses on the motivations of individuals. Why do they participate? Social psychology 
approaches are good examples of actor based approaches. Notably Gurr built on the work of 
Davies to develop his concept of relative deprivation, which can be described as individuals 
feeling like they are receiving less than what they are entitled to. According to his theory of 
relative deprivation people are most likely to revolt in situations where periods of 
improvement, such as sustained economic growth, are followed by a reversal or relapse. The 





Relative deprivation theory struggles to answer questions about forms of political violence 
and why riots may become rebellions and then revolutions
52
. Thus it is no signal that uprising 
is imminent; it is likely present, to some extent, in most societies. It is incapable of explaining 
the outcomes of revolution and its progress. It cannot answer questions about whose 
discontent matters and why
53
. Many of the problems with this approach stem from its sole 
focus on actors over structure. 
 
Another general theory developed by Smelser and Johnson focussed on the sub-systems of 
society (political system, economy etc) and what happened when one sub-system began to 
change independently. They theorised that imbalance can make incumbent regimes prone to 
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new ideologies which challenge its legitimacy
54
. This is similar to Functionalist theory which 
posits that the main task of governments is maintaining equilibrium in society. As such they 
must respond to challenges and demands in a manner which maintains equilibrium. Where 
Marxism would view revolution as the result of the inevitability of history, functionalists see 
it as a failure of government. The most prominent scholar in this field is Chalmers Johnson 
who theorised that political change occurred when governments could not keep up with 
pressures for change. This resulted in governments losing legitimacy and effectiveness. 
According to Johnson, unsuccessful revolutionary attempts were even considered instances of 
revolutionary change. This seems to be an exaggerated claim and a weakness of this approach 




Goldstone also views general theories as suffering from a purposive view of revolution. They 
assume that revolutions are the result of an opposition movement‘s efforts as opposed to an 
internal breakdown of the state. General theories were also premised on the assumption that 
modernisation would lead to grievance. These notions were built on single path 
modernisation assumptions which no longer hold true, as it is not assumed all societies will 




Skocpol also critiques the above approaches for their focus on voluntarism and their inability 
to answer important questions. More of her critique is provided in this chapter when the 
distinction between her structural approach and other approaches is discussed.  
 
The third phase, in the 1970‘s and 80‘s was dominated by structural approaches. A key 
difference of these theories was the emphasis placed on the nature and importance of the 
state. The structural approach will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Finally there is a fourth, more recent, stage in political scholarship that has been dominated 
by the search for democratisation since the 1990's. The Cold War era resulted in pressure to 
fit the global discourse about democratisation.  The discourse was dominated by Huntington's 
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 in the wake of Eastern European revolutions; followed by the 
prominence of Fukuyama's 'End of History' which positioned Western style democracy as the 
ideal system of governance
58
,  essentially claiming the triumph of Western style Liberal 
Democracy as a universal ideology. 
 
Middle Eastern political scholarship in the 1990's described the region as experiencing 
'Islamic exceptionalism', for not fitting the democratisation mould due to ‗cultural 
incompatibility‘
59
. There were 'democracy spotters' in the literature claiming declining 





Regime led reforms were often mistaken as democratisation when they were actually 
engineered toward regime survival. Lack of change in regime type was framed as stagnation; 





In terms of studying political change, Bank and Valbjørn, posit that the central question 
should be about what is as opposed to what ought to be? There needs to be a new way of 
studying Middle Eastern Politics, they have termed it post-democratisation, as it seeks to 
move scholarship beyond the search for a transition to democracy, towards a focus on the 
actual change
62
.  Essentially, they argue, scholars have been providing 'old wine in new 
bottles' and it is time to provide 'new wine in old bottles'. 
 
Does the argument against democratisation stand after the 'Arab Spring'? The MENA region 
experienced mass mobilisation and removed long time authoritarian leaders. Valbjørn 
believes that it would be foolish to call the events a process of democratisation. There are few 
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There has been too narrow a focus on the regime in the Arab Spring; attention to other 
internal and external events
64
 needs to be paid. Secondly, moving forward, scholarship should 
pay attention to the re-politicisation of the Arab world. This refers to the emergence of old 
collective actors as well as new ones that do not necessarily participate within the confines of 
conventional political participation
65
. This seems particularly pertinent given the resurgence 
of mass-mobilisation politics during the ‗Arab Spring‘. 
 
Democratisation can be further criticised for its focus on agency over structure. Huntington, 
for example, focuses on elites being central to the creation of democratic transitions, 
particularly moderate elites during times of crisis
66
. Agency (voluntarism) is given prominent 
place as an explanatory variable. Agency centred explanations will look at structures as being 
‗external constraints which  actors  may  or  may  not  encounter as  they  pursue  their  
goals
67
‘. Structural approaches by contrast view the interests of agents as being shaped by the 
structures and environments they encounter
68
. This critique fits well with Valbjørn‘s about 
too narrow a focus. 
 
This paper aims to move away from concluding that events in Egypt signal democratisation. 
Using a structural approach it attempts to study what is, and not what ought to be. It allows 
for focus on the regime, its domestic relationships, international relationships and any other 
pertinent structural conditions.  The structural approach allows for considering the re-
politicisation mentioned above. It provides new wine in an old bottle. 
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The Structural Approach 
 
This approach focuses on the actual relationships between groups in society. The approach 
used by this paper will be based on Theda Skocpol‘s structural approach, as it is the most 
prominent in the literature. Skocpol‘s approach is based on her study of three social 
revolutions in China, Russia and France, in her seminal work on structuralism States and 
Social Revolutions. 
 
The relationships between the state and domestic groups, as well as the state and other states, 
illuminate the susceptibility of that state to radical political change. Substantial strains or 
pressures in these relationships make the state vulnerable to groups in society who could 




The structural approach focuses on the state as a potentially autonomous entity. Krasner 
discusses the move toward statist approaches, which include Skocpol‘s structural approach in 
States and Social Revolution
70
. He defines the state as: ―public bureaucracy or administrative 




There are five characteristics which distinguish the statist from other approaches
72
, according 
to Krasner. These do not form a complete theory of the state; rather they help to explain how 
approaches like Skocpol‘s can be comprehended in relation to other approaches. Firstly 
statists see politics as more an issue of rule and maintaining control than resource allocation. 
Secondly the state and its policies should not be viewed as a result of society‘s preferences, 
rather as an actor in its own right. Thirdly statist approaches place emphasis on the way that 
structures and institutions shape and impact individuals decisions by forming perceptions of 
self interest. Fourthly, Krasner‘s work suggests viewing state structures as a product of 
historical contexts, as opposed to contemporary ones. Finally statist approaches focus on 
conflicts and disjuncture in political systems. It is not always clear what the rules of the game 
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Skocpol also discusses the political science and sociological theoretical views of the 1950's 
and 1960's, which preceded her work in States and Social Revolution, as society centred. 
These approaches did not give the role of the state much value. The government was viewed 
as an arena for resource allocation between economic/social interest groups. Most research 
centred on 'societal inputs' and 'governmental outputs'. The weakness of this was that often 




Skocpol maintained that while Neo-Marxists scholars from the 1960's focussed on the 
'capitalist state', they did however maintain a number of 'society centred assumptions'. These 
led to the central belief that the state is shaped by forces of production, thus assigning 
causality to state structures was difficult. The view of states changed during the 1970's due to 
increasing interdependence, they increasingly were viewed as actors. The centrality of the 
state became important; scholars looked back to writers like Weber and Hintze. They viewed 
the core of the state as emanating from its 'administrative, legal, extractive and coercive 
organisations
75
'. This view demands we see the state as more than an arena and its structures 
as being shaped by historical and transnational contexts. 
 
Viewing the state as central to any political analysis requires one consider state autonomy and 
capacity. State autonomy, in Skocpol‘s view, refers to the possibility that states may 
formulate policies which are not simply representative of the pressures and 'inputs' from 
groups in society. The ability to implement policies may be constrained by, among others, 
factors such as foreign relations/policy and important societal groups.
76
. In the case of Egypt 
this paper shows that domestic policy has been constrained over the last 20 years by the aid 
relationship with the US.  
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The structural approach focuses on the class relations in a state
77
; relations of states with one 
another and the relations of states with classes in society
78
. This is done with the aim of 
explaining the creation of a revolutionary situation/ political crisis. The concept of the state is 
central to a structural approach.  
 
There are three principles underlying Skocpol's structural approach
79
. The third principle, 
which concerns the state will be addressed first as it is central to a structural approach. It 
requires that one conceive of 'states as administrative and coercive organisations which are 




To understand the third principle, it is useful to discuss how it diverges from general 
assumptions underpinning other notions of revolution. It is widely regarded that revolutions 
start with a political crisis, followed by struggles in which organised political parties are 





Political crisis is assumed to be epiphenomenal, the result of an ‗incidental trigger‘. Political 
groups are assumed to represent social forces. These assumptions rely on another assumption 
made about the nature of political structures and struggles: that they can be reduced to socio-





Further assumptions about the source of state power are also rejected by Skocpol. Liberal 
theories (e.g. Johnson and Gurr) see power as stemming from legitimacy, and the cause of 
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political crisis as its loss. Marxists and political conflict writers (e.g. Tilly), view power as 
being fundamentally drawn from the ability to coerce. Both the liberals and Marxists, view 
the state as an arena for social conflict resolution (Marxists view it as an instrument of 
class)
83
. Neither political conflict theorists nor Marxists view the state as autonomous
84
. 
Skocpol critiques these views as they make conflict between the state and the dominant class 
absurd
85
. This ultimately implies that the state can in no way be an organisation for itself. 
Seegers contends when considering Skocpol's third principle, that the state can be potentially 
autonomous from socio-economic interests and structures while also recognising that it will 




Rather, according to Skocpol, state crisis arises from contradictions within the old regime 
itself, as opposed to being a result of societal strain (such as relative deprivation) or class 
struggles. The state should be viewed as a macro structure, not simply an arena. The state, by 
nature, extracts resources from the population and uses them to maintain coercive institutions. 
Power is viewed as stemming from administrative and coercive capacity. The extent to which 
coercive and administrative organisations are free from the dominant class will determine the 




The importance of competent and cohesive administrative and coercive state institutions is 
highlighted by the following quote. Speaking of the state from a structuralist perspective, 
Seegers states:  
 
―Here scholars view the states' political structure neither as the executive committee 
of a particular class (or interests), with inevitable 'intransigence', nor as a vacuous 
political arena where conflict takes place. The state's political structure is viewed as 
an administrative entity, staffed by bureaucrats, which is – to a varying degree- 
dependent on certain social groups for the supply of political support and economic 
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resources in order to fulfil its goals. Although administrative structures may vary, it is 





If institutions of the state have a degree of autonomy, they may pursue interests which 
conflict with those of the dominant class, taxation for instance. It may lead to further conflict 
by strengthening the state's position, as there is no guarantee that the state will use this 




Skocpol maintains that states generally have two main aims which affect their relationships 
with dominant class interests. These aims are the maintenance of social contract and 
competition with actual/potential states. The easiest way to achieve the first aim is to 
maintain the status quo through subordinating lower classes, thus state interests are generally 
aligned with those of the dominant class. In times of crisis the state may be forced to make 
concessions to achieve either aim which are at odds with the dominant class. The state will 
pursue interests in terms of controlling and taxing the population and recruiting for the 
military (a result of international competition) despite the interests of the dominant class, thus 




Finally, states have a degree of autonomy due to the geopolitical environment in which they 
operate, which establishes opportunities and limits. Skocpol citing Otto Hintze posits there 
are two factors which impact the ‗real organisation of the state‘: the structure of social classes 
and the external ordering of nation states and their position relative to one another
91
.   
 
The Remaining Principles 
 
This section explains the remaining principles of Skocpol‘s structural approach. The first 
principle is a ‗non-voluntarist, structural view of causes and processes‘
92
.  Alternative 
theories of revolution maintain that the old-regime is destroyed by purposively organised 
groups who have planned to do so. Skocpol suggests this view is flawed because it infers that 
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no regime can survive without the consensus of the majority
93
. This principle relates to the 
third one regarding state autonomy. Rejecting agency/voluntarist explanations also rejects 




The structural approach instead focuses on the objective, structural conditions for 
revolution
95
. The idea that social revolution is not made but comes is central
96
. Rather than 
viewing revolutions as the result of purposively organised groups, they are in fact as a result 
of these same groups (‗ideology and mass mobilised revolutionary organisations‘) exploiting 
‗revolutionary crises
97
‘. This is in line with the supposition that revolution is the result of a 
crisis representing a contradiction of the state. No matter how important one class or elite is 
in a revolution, simply studying their actions will never give the analyst a complete 
understanding
98
. Furthermore outcomes in most cases have differed vastly from the 
expectations and ideology of revolutionaries. Recognising these ideas, this paper adopts a 
structural approach, while still recognising that agency based explanations have value in 
terms of explaining the motivations of those groups exploiting state crisis. 
 
Identifying objectively conditioned and interweaving actions of the diversely situated groups 
in society is important. A look at institutionally determined relationships in society, i.e. 
between different groups as well as the interrelations of societies within the world, a focus on 
historically developing international structures is also useful. This principle will ultimately 




The second principle of the structural approach requires there ‗be reference to international 
structures and world historic developments‘
100
. Emphasis on world historical contexts, as 
they relate to the uneven spread of capitalist development and nation state formation is 
important. Alternative theories have also addressed this by applying an ideal type 
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. However as has been well noted not all countries will follow this 'ideal 
type'. What is important is historically transnational economic relations have always had a 
strong, differential influence on national economies
102
. The way the international system 
itself has developed over time has had a significant impact on world history
103
. Factors such 
as: state administrative efficiency, the political capacity for mass mobilisation and geographic 





Transnational factors must be considered by a structural approach. These ‗contextual 
variables‘, of which there are two, also affect the state and society. Firstly, the structure of the 
world capitalist economy and international system, give insight into the context and position 
of individual states, and forms the domestic class structure and state institutions. 
Transnational events during a revolution will also impact the outcome; according to Skocpol, 




The second contextual factor is the relevance of changes and transmissions in ‗world time‘; 
taking heed of historical orderings and world-historical changes and developments
106
.  The 
contexts within which revolutions occur are important, particularly in terms of the models 
and options available to revolutionary forces. ‗Breakthrough‘ developments may alter the 




The next section discusses Skocpol‘s stages of social revolution. These will be important as 
they provide a framework for answering the research questions posed by the paper.   
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Stages of Social Revolution 
 
This section looks at social revolution
108
 as a three stage process
109
. Only the first two are 
addressed as they can be applied to significant social change. They are central to the 
argument made in this paper, namely that Mubarak fell as a result of state crisis caused by 
tensions in the elite  exploited by the #January25th movement‘s urban insurrection. 
 
 The first stage is the emergence of a revolutionary/political crisis. The second stage details 
insurrection in the states agrarian structures led by rural peasants. The third stage deals with 
the consolidation phase of social revolution and is not addressed in this paper as it will be 





The state crisis stage is important to this paper. State crisis, particularly caused by tensions in 
the elite, is central to understanding what happened in Egypt and to answering the research 
questions. State crisis, according to Skocpol, can arise from the inability of the state to meet 
challenges posed by international pressure usually in the form of economic or military 
competition with another state. This can lead to military collapse or fiscal crisis. The state 




State crisis is also centred in the structures and situation of the state and will tend to 
undermine and/or disorganise ‗centrally coordinated and coercive controls over potentially 
rebellious lower classes‘
112
. Old regimes are often constrained by the relationship between 
their ‗institutionalised autocratic organisations‘ and the ‗landed upper classes
113
. A cross 
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pressure develops between the external/international challenge and the domestic class 
structures. It is at this point, that a cross pressure is reached, and states break apart as their 




This opens up the opportunity 
for a revolution ‗spearheaded‘ from below. 
 
A ‗fundamentally politically relevant tension‘ in society, according to Skocpol, can be found 
in the ‗relationships of producing classes to dominant classes and states, and in the 
relationships of the landed dominant classes to the autocratic imperial states‘
115
. Tension 
between the state/dominant class and the producing class arises from partnership in 
exploitation of the latter by the former. Tension between the dominant class and the state 




Democratic reform is not in the favour of dominant class members because as a minority in a 
representative system they would not have the same power or benefits. This realisation may 
result in dominant class members in public office obstructing reform policies. This can lead 
to a breakdown in administrative and military capacity
117
. Important basic reform policies, 
necessitated by external pressure/competition, may not be enacted
118
.  When the military, is 
no longer able to enforce the dominant class‘s place in society, there is room for an ‗assault 
from below‘
119
.   
 
The second stage of social revolution is peasant insurrection. This stage is also relevant in 
explaining the events in Egypt. Social revolutions are not achieved by political crises alone. 
Political crises may create ‗social-revolutionary situations,‘ which can lead simply to a 
breakup of the existing system which is replaced by a similar one more liberal in its 
leanings
120
. Seegers also mentions Trimberger's assertion that in some cases bureaucracies 
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This second stage assumes a social revolution has occurred accompanied by an insurrection 
in the states agrarian structures led by rural peasants. All of these assumptions would be 
erroneous in the Egyptian case. However, in the Egyptian case it is clear there has been an 
insurrection from below, in the form of urban and middle class protests/uprisings
122
. The 
second stage is still applicable taking the above into consideration, and is used in this paper 
with the caveat that there is no assumption of social revolution occurring in Egypt.  
 
 
Peasant insurrections coincide with, and take advantage of, lack of government control and 
supervision, resulting from political crisis. They allow for the breakdown of agrarian social 
relations and hinder political and military supporters favouring liberalisation/counter 
revolution. This is the case in primarily agrarian countries, where peasants are the major 
producing class
123
. Fundamental politically relevant tension is between the dominant and 
producing class. As the agrarian peasant class is the producing class, a cautious transposition 




Peasant insurrections, as studied by Skocpol in the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, 
were significant because they were widespread and targeted at landlords. As landlords were 
the dominant class at the time, striking their property and power served to ‗weaken mainstays 
of the socioeconomic and political orders of the old regimes‘
125
. Because peasant revolts were 
widespread, and targeted at landlords, they created constraints in terms of the socio-political 




It is important when applying the structural approach to look for a pattern of the behaviour 
beyond any previous regional unrest and explain more widespread and targeted behaviour.  A 
structural approach maintains that it is not useful to look at the factors which are important 
explanatory variables in other approaches (such as: ideology, exploitation and relative 
deprivation). These explanations do not tell us what peasants could do as an aggregate about 
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their grievances. The important question is: ‗what transforms the peasantry, if only at local 




This said the role of social media in the Arab spring is undeniable. It should be viewed as a 
breakthrough event or contextual variable as well as a factor which affects the ability to 
transform protesters into a collective force. While agency centred explanations are not 
afforded much weight by the structural approach, the role of agency in terms of the impact of 
social media is an important variable in the Egyptian case which is considered in this paper.  
 
To achieve collective force peasants must have ‗internal leverage‘ – which is the capacity for 
organised and collective action against superiors. This can be explained by structural and 
situational conditions. Firstly the solidarity between peasants by degree and kind; secondly 
the extent to which peasants are autonomous from landlords. Finally whether or not there is a 




The next section looks at elite theory and the notion of elite unity. This is done to give a 
better understanding of how state crisis developed in Egypt, as elite tensions are key to 
understanding how Mubarak lost power, and the role the military played in the outcome. 
 
Elite unity and the stability of regimes 
 
The above sections have established that a state's power stems from its administrative 
capacity and coercive force. This leads to the conclusion that elites
129
 are important for 
stability.  
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Skocpol demonstrates the importance of elite stability when explaining crises in the French 
revolution. Crisis was precipitated by the monarchy's inability to deal with debt. It tried to 
institute a new system of taxation that was at odds with the interests of the ruling classes. 
There were demonstrations against the taxation, which the military was reluctant to suppress. 
All factions of the ruling class called for an Estates-General (general assembly) in which the 
way forward could be decided. Arguments broke out between the ruling classes about how 
voting would be conducted. This led to a paralysis and 'dissolution of the administrative 
system of the Old Regime‘
130
. This demonstrates how a fracture in the elite, and between the 
elite and the state, can be a cause of state crisis. 
 
Putnam drawing on the work of Michels speaks about elite unity, describing the elite as 
'internally homogenous, unified and self conscious'. Members of the elite are like members of 





Higely and Burton also maintain elite unity is central to regime stability. They describe elite 
unity as being present when there is firstly a consensus on the rules/ codes of political 
participation; and secondly when they participate in a structure which is integrated to a 
degree which allows them access to one another as well as key decision makers. This allows 




Hague and Harrop assert the elite's belief in their right to rule is central, and revolutions seen 
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980's were in part due to a failure of confidence among the 
leaders in those countries in themselves. They quote Schoplflin: ―authoritarian elite sustains 
itself in power not just through force and the threat of force but more importantly, because it 
has some vision of the future by which it can justify itself to itself. No regime can survive 
long without purpose
133
‖. They also suggest that all the elite need to agree on the 'rules of the 
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There are two periods of elite theory, classical and pluralistic. Classical theory deals with a 
minority group which is cohesive, unified and controls decision making for the majority. 





In the classical literature the elite owe their power to revolution, conquest, or may have 
societal influence by virtue of owning productive means or having social or religious sway
136
.  
In terms of unity Mosca asserts: 
―But the man who is at the head of the state would certainly not be able to rule 
without the support of a numerous class to enforce respect for his orders and to have 
them carried out; and granting that he can make one individual, or indeed many 
individuals, in the ruling class feel the weight of his power, he certainly cannot be at 
odds with the class as a whole or do away with it... without the support of which 




This is summed up by what Meisel termed the three c‘s, elite should have group 
consciousness, coherence and conspiracy (the latter meaning ‗common will to action‘).  If an 
elite does not act in a unified manner, it is more a group of ‗top persons‘, than an elite.  
Cohesiveness is considered to be the primary strength of any elite in classical theories. 
According to Mosca another element to regime stability is the quality of its lower stratum, the 
bureaucracy. It provides a pool from which the elite draw members, as well as being the 




Pluralist elite theory draws on a discourse related to modernisation theory. It contends that as 
societies develop, and diversify their economies, interest groups develop. These groups exert 
pressure on those who rule, and this leads to specialisation of the political process. Thus the 
elite that manage labour and housing state institutions, for instance, are not the same. 
 
Whereas classical elite theory sees the hierarchy of elites as shaped like a pyramid, the 
pluralists would see it as a range of pyramids for diversified tasks.  
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In advanced democratic societies, there will be a number of elites making political decisions.  
The implication is that there is no longer a single unified elite.  
 
Pluralists like Dahl recognise that societies outside of Western Europe and the United States 
are unlikely to be understood by this theory. As mentioned it applies only to advanced 
democracies, as well as states with a ―strong elite of professional politicians with firm bases 





It is clear then that the Egyptian elites would fall in the classical paradigm. Egypt cannot be 
described as an advanced democracy. As is shown in this paper it is also far from having 
professional politicians who participate in pluralistic parties/legislatures. Thus elite unity is 
still applicable. 
 
The next section looks at critiques of Skocpol‘s structural approach. This is done to 
determine if there are any serious pitfalls to its application. 
 
Critiques of Skocpol’s Structural Approach 
 
William McNeil criticises Skocpol‘s approach for not recognising the role of personality in 
revolution. He contends that for Skocpol to accept the role of personality in revolution would 
ruin the 'sociology' she is trying to find in human affairs
140
. Goodwin mentions a number of 
critiques of Skocpol, which he refutes as a misreading of the text. The criticism that Skocpol 
only believes state institutions matter when explaining how and why revolutions occur is 
addressed by giving the example of her analysis of peasant revolts. He does say that it is 
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Similarly, the contention that the role of ideas and beliefs is ignored is refuted by her work in 





Finally the contention that a general theory explaining social revolution can be inductively 
derived through comparison, this is the criticism that Skocpol‘s structural theory might not be 
theoretical at all. Goodwin notes that, though Skocpol rejects meta-theory, she does 
deductively compare several instances of revolution and non revolution in order to test a 
theoretically based hypothesis. Thus her theory is both inductive and deductive. It is 




The strongest critique of Skocpol‘s approach comes from William Sewell
144
. He does 
recognise that the structural approach mixes the conceptual power of the hierarchical method 
while gaining from the sense of ‗sequence, conjuncture and contingency‘ that is gained by the 
narrative method
145
. However he argues that, the role of ideology in revolution was 
inadequate, and provided an alternative conception which he then used to explain the French 
case.  
 
Sewell agrees to the rejection of ideology as a causal factor in a purposive movement, not the 
view that ideology is an altogether useless explanatory variable. For instance the difference 
between the outcome of property in the French and Russian revolutions was ideology. He 
contends that the way in which Skocpol explains this, difference in world time – the 
availability of world time historical models- is basically recognising the role of ideology. 
There is also inconsistent treatment of the role of ideology vs. class as it is included with 
other factors to explain the outbreak of revolution as opposed to being considered of no 




Skocpol admitted at later points in her book Social 
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Despite the critiques of the structural approach, this paper has chosen this theoretical 
approach as the most appropriate tool to understand the Egyptian case. It will be 
demonstrated in the next section why this approach is deemed appropriate. 
 
Appropriateness of the Structural Approach 
 
Now that the structural approach has been introduced, its appropriateness for this paper can 
be discussed. The aim of this paper is to understand how Mubarak could be forced to step 
down after a long, durable tenure. Even though the structural approach was formulated to 
understand social revolution, it can still be fruitfully employed to understand 'political crisis' 
and significant social and political change. It provides a framework for answering the 
research questions in a meaningful, contextually relevant way.  
 
A good demonstration of a structural approach to explaining state crisis in a situation which 
did not amount to social revolution is Robert Price‘s work The Apartheid State in Crisis. 
Price looks at the end of the Apartheid regime and the associated state crisis. He notes how 
the economic, domestic, regional and international environments changed over the course of 
Apartheid, and how these structural changes reinforced and exacerbated one another to 
produce state crisis
148
. There were four shocks to the Apartheid system, some produced by 
the system, others with implications for it.  Among these he notes the structural implication 
of the Apartheid designed economy was insufficient skilled labour (a product of ‗bantu 
education‘ and labour policies) and low domestic demand
149
. He also discusses changing 





There are a number of reasons to use a structural approach to address the research questions 
posed by this paper. The Arab Spring has had disparate results across the MENA region and a 
structural approach allows for a meaningful explanation of these. The framework is useful as 
it gives guidance on the pertinent questions to ask when understanding significant 
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political/social change. The Egyptian state and its institutions are closely linked to the NDP 
which can be considered ‗the state party'
151
, and is not separate from the state in any 
meaningful way
152
.   
 
Institutions of state such as the police, judiciary, constitution and to an extent in the past the 
military, have been under NDP control. The NDP has maintained emergency law in Egypt for 
long periods to squash political opposition, and has changed the constitution, a state 
institution, to achieve the same goal. As is demonstrated in chapter 3, state institutions have 
been crafted by the NDP's predecessor organisations and so are inextricably linked to it. 
When studying the Egyptian state, government or regime it is difficult to unpick one from the 
other. This highlights why a structural approach is appropriate, it focuses on the state and its 





Skocpol and Abrahamian‘s analysis of the Iranian revolution is important for this paper. The 
Iranian case, like that undertaken in this paper, did not meet the classic case Skocpol 
described in her work. There was no military defeat, nor was there a peasant uprising in rural 
areas. The revolution was mainly urban in nature. The Iranian state was also not an agrarian 
bureaucracy
154
. Skocpol‘s structural approach was criticised at the time as these points 
obviously were not congruent with her assertions in States and Social Revolutions. 
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Skocpol states explicitly of the Iranian case: ―I did suggest in the conclusion to my book that 
its basic framework of analysis should be applicable to other revolutions, even in different 
types of societies and different world-historical circumstances from the 'classical' case I 
studied‖
155
. The Iranian case can still be considered from a perspective which considers the 
Iranian state, its society and contextualises it in its international environment. 
 
Skocpol demonstrates how state relationships with society were mediated through oil revenue 
expenditures. Modernisation efforts led to rural-urban migration, resulting in burgeoning 
urban populations, reliant on the state. When revenue contracted, the Shah could not rely on 





The Shah managed to further alienate the religious elite through exclusionary modernisation. 
This created a network of ideologically motivated and networked religious opposition. This 





Abrahamian also successfully employs the approach, focussing on the socio-economic 
pressures which undermined the political establishment. He also notes the importance of the 
impact of oil revenues on per capita income, education and industry. This resulted in a 




Despite growth achieved by oil rents the Shah‘s regime was unpopular with the new urban 
working class. All forms of political opposition had been banned including: labour unions, 
opposition parties and professional associations. This led to a gap between the new middle 
class and the regime, exacerbated by the introduction of policies which only benefited the 
upper class. Despite the fact that Iran had made strides in education and health there was still 
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wide-spread illiteracy and high infant mortality. Rural-urban migration had worsened living 
conditions in urban settings. Despite the White Revolution there was still high inequality in 
land ownership, as well as significant income inequality. This was worsened by a number of 




A consequence of not allowing any pressure groups meant no links between the monarchy 
and broader population were established. The regime also began to break links with the 
established old middle class, the bazaar shop owners. This class remained important as it 
controlled much of the country‘s retail trade, and its organisational ‗guilds‘, as well as having 




The initial policy toward the bazaars had been ‗let sleeping dogs lie‘. In 1975 the Shah 
transformed Iran from a military monarchy into a ‗fascist-style totalitarian regime‘ by 
forming the Resurgence Party. An implication was the regime sought to take control of the 
bazaars and religious establishment. The bazaars became the target of government 
propaganda, painting them as being behind spiralling inflation. When religious leaders 




This served to turn the bazaar shop-owners, and the majority of the religious community 
against the Shah. As Abrahamian says: ―For any state to survive an economic crisis... it needs 




The Iranian case is powerful because it shows that even cases which do not fit the 'ideal type' 
can still be analysed using the structural approach. It also demonstrates that the structural 
approach can be successfully employed in a Middle Eastern country, with more similar 
cultural and geopolitical realities to that of Egypt than the French, Russian and Chinese cases.  
In conclusion 
 
This chapter has elucidated competing theories of social change/ violence with the aim of 
highlighting why the structural approach is a relevant choice. It has particularly discussed 
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why democratisation would not be useful. It then discussed the emphasis of the structural 
approach of the state and important assumptions made about its nature by the structural 
approach. The relevant stages of revolution, to this paper were then discussed. Finally elite 
theory was discussed in terms of the importance of elite unity. Skocpol does address the 
notion of elites through dominant class analysis. This paper however uses the more direct 
elite theory as it draws out the need to focus on class relations (which come with limitations 
of the class concept itself). Finally the structural approach was discussed in terms of its more 
direct appropriateness for the case of Egypt. In conclusion this chapter highlighted the need 
for a structural and contextual explanation of divergent outcomes of Arab Spring social 
movements; the usefulness of state centred approach in Egypt and finally the applicability of 




This chapter has laid a theoretical foundation for the remainder of this paper.  Understanding 
the importance of contextual and historical information to analyse a structural case, this paper 
now turns to an explanation of the Egyptian political landscape from Ottoman domination up 
to the events beginning on the 25
th
 of January 2011. 
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Chapter 3: Historical Narrative of Egypt’s Political Landscape  
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a narrative of Egypt‘s political landscape with an emphasis on the 
creation and evolution of the Egyptian state and state institutions such as the military and 
constitution. The understanding of the Egyptian state provides the basis of analysis for later 
chapters and foundational context for the argument. 
 
This chapter discusses Egypt‘s history of external domination from the Ottomans to the 
British. The discussion of the contemporary Egyptian state is broken into the following: 
political themes, society and economy and foreign policy. Each of these sections will trace 
changes from Nasser through to Mubarak – the aim is to explore relationships and structures 
as opposed to individual leaders
164
. In line with this, the sections discuss the state, its 
development and domestic/external relationships. This discussion provides a contextual 
backdrop for locating contradictions in the old regime to explain state crisis. 
 
The Colonial Context and establishment of the Modern state 
 
By the beginning of the 20th century the MENA region, including Egypt, had largely been 
dominated by the Ottoman Empire for over 400 years. The Empire was under pressure 
internally from its own efforts to reform, and externally by the advancement of European 




‗Modern Egypt‘ began with the rule of Mohamed Ali
166
 (1805-1849), who was named Pasha 
of Egypt (by the Ottomans), a royal hereditary title which offered Egypt partial independence 
                                                 
164
 As the approach employed by this paper is structural, and so non-voluntarist, it is more useful to discuss the 
evolution of the state and its relations than to provide a narrative of individual leaders. Thus the chapter’s 
focus is on the state, its institutions (like the military and bureaucracy), important groups in society (the elite, 
working class, business elite etc) and their relations with each other and the state as well as the state relations 
with other states. Leaders are discussed in order to give the narrative temporal clarity and where it is deemed 
they had structural impacts. 
165
 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd Edition, (London and 
New York: Routeledge, 2006), 5-6. 
166

















. During this period Egypt underwent significant change including land 
reform, which affected the class structure, as Ali made himself and close allies‘ owners of 




State institutions were created during this time including a French style bureaucracy staffed 
with Turkish bureaucrats. An independent Egyptian conscript army was also created led by 
French and Turkish officers
169
. Ali‘s son, Ismael developed Egypt‘s transport with the 
addition of rail and steam shipping on the Nile
170
. An outcome of development projects was 
the creation of a middle class, composed of doctors, teachers, engineers etc
171
. It was in this 
class that nationalistic sentiment would develop. 
 
Neither Ali nor Ismael had Egyptian development as a goal. Their projects were dynastic, 
aimed at exploiting a rich country they were able to subdue
172
. Sayyid-Marsot contends Ali 




Over time, however, the middle class became more 'Egyptian'. Prominent Egyptian families 
were tasked with sourcing soldiers for the conscript army and rewarded with swathes of 
fertile land. Many of the newly formed Egyptian middle class married into Turkish or 
Anatolian families
174
. The composition of the class structure changed significantly between 
1800 and 1900, the number of Egyptians considered to be poor peasants changed from 90% 
to 75%.  The economy was still largely under the control of the Turkish and Europeans, but 




A growing sense of nationalism was galvanised by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. 
In 1881 Egyptian army officers attempted to stage a revolt against Khedive Tawfiq (Ali‘s 
grandson) which ended when the British sent troops to enforce the Khedive‘s position 
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beginning the British occupation
176
. This was a turning point in the way Ali‘s line was 
perceived by Egyptians. They were considered to be ‗turn coats‘, agents of foreign 
imperialism. 
 
In the case of Egypt, an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement had been reached in 
1899
177
. When the British refused to allow a Wafd party
178
 delegation to attend the Paris 
Peace Conference it ended in a wide-scale revolt in 1919 and resulted in the formation of the 
National Party. The British reassessed their position in Egypt; in 1922 they granted the 
Egyptians a qualified independence
179
. That said the French and British were still very much 
in control of the region in the mid 1920's
180
. The Ali dynasty realised they had to make room 





Despite the new government, problems persisted. Land ownership was still concentrated in a 
small, wealthy class. Much of the economy was foreign owned and stunted, with a lack of 
opportunities for the middle class. There was growing unemployment; urbanisation and 




The monarchy was incapable of dealing with middle class discontent and nationalism. Middle 
class elites were entering the political sphere calling for the redistribution of wealth and 
power in Egypt. This ultimately led to the formation of a group of middle class army officers, 
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The next section introduces Egypt‘s leaders since the 1952 coup and how each came to 
power. This provides temporal context when discussing the evolution of state structures and 
relationships in latter sections. 
From Nasser to Mubarak 
 
Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in a bloodless coup in 1952
184
. The group was made up 
of military officers/elites with a strong nationalist imperative
185
. The Nasser era marked the 




Anwar Sadat, also a member of the ‗Free Officers‘, came to power after Nasser‘s death in 
1970 and attended military college with Nasser
187
. Hosni Mubarak, vice-president under 
Sadat came to power in October 1981 after Sadat's assassination by radical Islamic splinter 




Nasser had been viewed as a charismatic revolutionary, the leader of Arab nationalism. Sadat 
was viewed as the village chief or oumda, a man of honour and piety. Mubarak, According to 




This section has provided a background of the evolution of leadership within Egypt, the next 
section looks at political themes such as the creation of state parties, the bureaucracy and 
evolution and composition of the elite since the 1952 coup. 
 
 Political Themes 
 
Nasser reformed Egypt‘s political system and process. He replaced the ‗Turco-dominated 
aristocracy‘ with Egyptians
190
, took power from opposition political parties (by trying and 
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Significantly the composition of the elite changed, under the monarchy it had been  
comprised of the king‘s men, foreign businessmen and landlord-lawyers, the elite were now 
made up of members from the ‗Free Officers‘ group, a small number of civilian technocrats 
and educated professionals. Civilian elites were drawn mainly from the middle to upper 




Marfleet says: ―The imperative of control was decisive and soon a new political formation 
was in evidence – one in which senior military men and technocrats were dominant' and 
speaking of Nasser: 'increasingly he ruled by concentrating power among a small group of 




Nasser recognised the importance of Islam while maintaining secularism in politics. He 
promoted Egypt as the leader of the Arab world, free of emphasis on Islam, which he viewed 
as having a cultural, not political, role in the future of Egypt
194
. This led to a strongly socialist 




Nasser formed the Liberation Rally (LR) in 1953 followed by the National Union (NU) in 
1956
196
. These were mass state parties and served the elite
197
. In 1962, when faced with 
political competition, Nasser transformed these institutions into the Arab Socialist Union 
(ASU)
198
. The ASU served the purpose of forming a contract between ‗regionally and locally 
influential elite‘, and provided a level of legitimacy through in-party elections after military 
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defeat to Israel in 1968 which balanced the left and right wing elements of the elite
199.
 In 
reality the union was run by the military elite and high level bureaucrats, its main goal the co-
option of the opposition
200




When Sadat came to power the greatest threat to stability was competition within the elite. 
There were the leftists associated with Ali Sabri and the larger conservative group led by 
Sadat
202
. Sadat undertook a series of reforms to cement his power; returning some land 
sequestered under land reform to wealthy families. He reoriented foreign policy toward the 
West (preparing for the Israeli peace process) and pursued economic liberalisation to solidify 
his base among the right-wing, under his Infitah or ‗open door economic policy‘. It allowed 
for more free foreign investment in Egypt and meant the elite could access new benefits. 
Blaydes contends that these liberalisations led to the formation of new business elite of 
speculators and profiteers established in the 1970's
203
. They joined the class of private 
capitalists and together with senior members of the military and the bureaucratic elite, 




Hinnebusch describes the power elite as: vice presidents, ministers, party executives, 
generals, and provincial governors. This group can further be distinguished as having a core 
membership with influence over Sadat. The top and core elite were reliant on Sadat for their 
positions and followed his lead. The middle elite were civil servants and senior military 




The elite under Sadat underwent a transformation. Where Nasser‘s core elite came from the 
military, Sadat cemented power by a ‗civilianisation‘ of the elite, removing officers that 




                                                 
199
 Blaydes, Elections and, 32. 
200
 Marfleet, ―State and,‖ 26. 
201
 These institutions demonstrate how it came to be that the government, regime and state are so linked. The 
institutions of state were purpose built by the Egyptian military elite, and changed at will when they needed to 
serve a different purpose.   
202
 Blaydes, Elections and, 33. 
203
 Ibid, 34. 
204
 Marfleet, ―State and,‖ 21. 
205
 Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics, 109-110. 
206















Sadat also initiated an 'Open Dialogue' to establish the preferences of the elite without 
voicing his own. During this dialogue, the elite called for greater political liberty and more 
competition. In 1976 Sadat formed a committee to discuss political reform which led to the 
formation of three platforms which became opposition parties. This appeased the West, 
proving the regime could open up political space as well as 'courting' the conservative elite 
and business class. This class would remain as the power political elite, according to Blaydes, 
during the Mubarak era
207
. In 1978 political reform led to the replacement of the ASU with 
the formation of the NDP and other state controlled parties. Egypt changed from a single 




According to Osman, following Sadat's assassination, Mubarak served as a 'national 
tranquiliser'. He was considered by some to lack strong leadership qualities, but was lauded 




Mubarak inherited a jumbled legacy from Sadat. Peace with Israel and its consequences for 
Egypt's regional standing, the existence of what was termed the 'Infitah mafia' and finally 





The social base Mubarak inherited from Sadat was a result of the realignment of classes from 
the ‗Infitah‘. Realignment resulted in an alliance between 'elements from the pre-
revolutionary semi-aristocracy, the state bourgeoisie of the 1960's and the commercial 




Blaydes contends the Mubarak regime‘s power stemmed from the right-centred elite and 
military, which were a vital component of its stability
212
. Senior military officials provided 
the Mubarak regime with 'bedrock support'
213
. According to Osman Mubarak continued to 
invest in the security apparatus signalling that his trust lay more with the interior ministers, 
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Society and Economy 
 
In the Nasser era class relations changed, in theory, by the shift in ideology toward socialism. 
The new regime‘s rhetoric was serving citizens equally and a goal of the state was to 
eradicate inequality and class, the state proclaimed its role as one of intervention to narrow 




The relationship between the state and the elite changed to a point. Nationalisation and land 
reform meant that private capital was tolerated not encouraged. It is clear however, that the 
institutions established under Nasser, the ASU and NU, in the ry socialist, did little to 





The relationship between the state and the working class was formed by policies of the 
Nasser era. During the 1950's union leaders were co-opted with lasting implications. In return 
for guarantees of their own positions and those in the public sector, union bosses supported 
the regime which Marfleet quoting Beinin described as ―a military dictatorship that had 
repeatedly demonstrated its unalterable opposition to a free trade union movement, the right 
to strike, and any form of independent initiative and action by workers‖
217
.  Even Nasser 
loyalists claimed the ASU's main function was to spy for the regime. 
 
Beinin says:  
―social relations of production have remained similar: neither under 'socialism' nor 
under 'capitalism' have blue collar workers exercised significant influence over 
conditions in their workplaces, and both public – and private-sector workplaces have 
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been managed in an extremely hierarchical and authoritarian manner, involving 




Changes implemented by 'Arab Socialism' did however improve the standard of living of the 
general population. Hinnebusch terms these 'egalitarian measures aimed to broaden 
opportunities and narrow class gaps'. They included open tertiary education, guaranteed state 
employment after graduation, full capacity employment in state firms, subsidies, price 
controls, and rent reductions
219
. Education and employment policies had perverse structural 
outcomes though which established contradictions in the state. Hinnebusch says:  
 
―The regime also pushed ahead the development of education and modernising skills. 
Education expanded by about 8% each year, roughly equally at all levels‖ 
And  
―Unfortunately, the supply of man power was not well-tailored to the needs of the 
economy. Despite efforts to shift education towards scientific and technical fields, the 
guarantee of employment to graduates channelled an excess of students into 
traditional fields resulting in a scarcity of middle-level technicians and too many 




According to Hinnebusch the form of socialism Nasser undertook is known as etatism. The 
basic premise of etatism is that the best way for modernisation to occur is under the 




There were two pillars of economic reform under Nasser. The first was land reform, seen as a 
means of correcting skewed wealth ownership. It aimed to transform an essentially feudal 
system into one based on ‗progress and equity'
222
.There were two periods of land reform, the 
first in 1952 followed by another in 1961
223
.  
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The second pillar was the creation of the public sector. This entailed opening state owned 
factories and businesses, and the nationalisation of almost all of Egypt‘s large businesses. 





When Sadat came to power after Nasser‘s death he continued with welfare policies like free 
tertiary education. The inherited free tertiary education policy did not serve the purposes of 





Sadat (and Mubarak later) actively sought to undo Nasser era socialist policies. The state 
withdrew from providing basic services to the amma (general public) such as education, 
health services etc. Under Nasser policy had focussed on service provision for the amma, the 
base Nasser relied on for power. Realising he would have to counter dissent from the left, as 
well as realising that supporting the amma was not fiscally viable, Sadat narrowed his support 
base. His policies benefitted the khassa (privileged class)
226
.   
 
This illuminates the changing relationship between the state and domestic classes. It 
highlights the shift toward the khassa, away from the amma in terms of preferential access to 
resources from the Sadat era onwards
227
. It also exhibits how Sadat and his elite changed 
existing socio-economic structures in terms of reversing the socialist system of welfare 
provision to benefit the group which he appealed to for support. 
 
Mubarak‘s early years in office after Sadat‘s assassination were marked by calm, stability and 
a sense of liberalisation. According to Osman, many of Sadat‘s controversial laws were 
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discreetly shelved. Civil associations and professional syndicates were allowed to develop. 
There was a relaxing of restrictions against political competitors through parliamentary 
elections were on list systems which allowed opposition parties to aggregate votes that would 




During this early period Mubarak focussed on economic problems by upgrading the country‘s 
infrastructure. He was initially reluctant to enact reforms suggested by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), fearing the negative effect on lower classes
229
. By 1991 prevailing 
economic conditions meant the government needed short term financing and so adopted IMF 
structural adjustment programmes which led to reductions in Egypt‘s welfare system
230
. 
Marfleet argues that despite tough cutbacks under IMF conditionality, Mubarak managed to 




An increase in economic liberalisation and electoral competition was not associated with an 
increase in democracy. Rather than a genuine attempt at opening up political space, electoral 
competition was allowed as a means of distributing resources among Egypt‘s rent-seeking 
elite
232
. Economic liberalisation created an environment in which clientalistic relationships 
thrived in the political sphere
233
. The Mubarak era state is described by Marfleet as: ''a state 
which combined centralised control over economic and political affairs with encouragement 




In terms of Mubarak's mixed inheritance, according to Ayubi, there were a number of 
structural contradictions in the state. Firstly, the state tried to maintain a role as arbiter 
between classes, but was clearly more amenable to the Infitah business class
235
. Secondly the 
state attempted to secure the support of the top echelons of elite, which widened the wage 
differential between the top bureaucracy and state/public officials. The bottom bureaucracy 
became disgruntled which led to strikes (e.g. the 'mutiny' of central security forces in 1986). 
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A third contradiction, which can be noted in a contemporary sense, was caused by Sadat's 
alliance with Islamic groups which sparked a large student based movement, a demographic 
which suffered the outcomes of the Infitah policy and subsequently turned against the state. 
Finally in terms of foreign policy, during the Mubarak era some of Egypt's notable allies, the 
US and International Financial Institutions (IFI), agitated for political/economic change 
which would weaken the regime's stability
236
. The mixed bag of old and new reforms 
inherited from Sadat led to contradictions in the regime. 
 
Class relations remained important as the neo-liberal agenda was accelerated in 2004, when 
Dr Nazif was appointed to a cabinet position specifically tasked with furthering it. Policies 
led to wide scale job losses
237
. Protests, which have been occurring since the ‗Infitah‘ policy 
of 1974, have become more ‗narrowly based among urban working class‘ over the last ten 
years
238
. There is also the sense that workers did not associate their grievances with the 
regime and the lack of democracy. Beinin describes the movements as:  
 
―Rooted in informal, local networks in industrial cities and suburbs, the 
workers movement does not have a national leadership, organisation or program. 
There have rarely been calls for democratisation or regime change; more typically, 




In the first 5 months of 2009 that there were over 200 collective actions (strikes and protests) 
in Mubarak's Egypt
240
. These were a result of the advancement of neo-liberalism, which 
began with Sadat‘s ‗Open Door‘ policy in and subsequent IMF structural adjustment 




The next section traces Egypt‘s foreign policy and relations from British colonisation to the 
Mubarak era, with the aim of locating external pressures on the regime. 
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British colonialism laid foundations for future political relations in the region. It established 
central administration and colonial policies in many MENA states
242
. When Nasser came to 
power the influence of British colonialism was a driving force behind foreign policy, 




An agreement reached in 1954 allowed for the withdrawal of British armed forces from the 
Suez area. Developments in the region eventually led to the Suez War between an alliance of 
France, Britain and Israel against Egypt
244
. The result was a Joint Defence Agreement 





Foreign relationships during the Nasser era were underpinn d by nationalist rhetoric of Egypt 
as an Arab hegemon. There was a drive to replace ‗Western domination‘ with Egyptian 
influence.
246
 Due to weakening Western influence in the region, there was an awakening of 
Arab nationalism. Egypt made significant strides in its foreign policy goals including: the 
withdrawal of the British, the capture of Suez Canal as well as the defeat of Western security 




This ‗Arab Nasserite nationalism‘, was at odds with the interests of three major players in the 
region, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel
248
. Egypt was not only exerting its 
influence in the region but competing with other states in this regard. After the Suez Canal 
crisis, backing of Algerian rebels against the French and sending troops to Yemen on the 
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Saudi border to support a coup attempt, Nasser and his regional project were viewed in a 
much more serious light. He was considered a regional hero, which led to the Syrians 
forming a United Arab Republic with Egypt
249
. Regional competition had structural 
implications in later years as it is likely it was a driving force behind changes such as 
education reform, which Nasser instituted. 
 
Nasser‘s drive to remove Western influence put him at loggerheads with the US because 
ousting the British from the Suez Canal and bases on the Gulf meant America was solely 
responsible for protecting oil reserves on which it was reliant. Nasser was also a threat 
because of his relationship with the Soviets, involving weapons dealing and funding for 
national projects
250
. He established the West and former imperial powers as the ‗enemy‘, and 
used his projects of ‗Arab nationalism‘ to unite both Egyptians and regional Arab states 




The most pressing foreign policy issue for Sadat when he came to power and after loss in war 
to Israel was ending the occupation of Sinai. Nasser had thought the only solution to the 
situation was force; resources had been diverted to the military. Sadat changed this policy and 
considered the use of force once it became apparent diplomacy was no longer an option. This 
policy was favourable with the new ‗Westernised civilian elite‘ in Sadat‘s inner circle. It 
entailed moving away from the Soviet Union, who refused to back Egypt militarily, and 




From 1974 to 1976 Sadat redirected foreign policy away from Arab nationalism and pursued 
US patronage; Egypt‘s relationship with the Soviet Union was ‗near breaking point‘. When 
the Soviets pulled out of the region Egypt‘s military strength was weaker than Israel‘s, Sadat 
took advantage of victory in the October war and the oil embargo to signal to the US 'the 
need to placate the Arabs if US Middle East interests were to survive‘
253
. The result of 
mediation was the Sinai 1 and 2 agreements which removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli war. 
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When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 an opportunity for Egypt to reassert itself as a regional 
leader was lost
255





Egypt's relationship with the US strengthened its military. Since 1979 Egypt 
has been the second biggest recipient of American foreign aid behind Israel. Since 1987 
Egypt annually received $1.3 billion. Part of this aid had been aimed at promoting 
democracy, which many have suggested has not been pushed for aggressively enough. Sharp 





Aid has come with pressure for economic/political reform. In a 2003 speech, President Bush 
admonished Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes suggesting Egypt spearhead change. The 
issue was raised again during a meeting between Mubarak and Bush in 2004. However, when 
protesters agitated for reform before the 2005 elections and were silenced by the regime‘s 




On the issue of the abuse of human rights a key factor is the alliance between Egypt and the 
US in the fight against terrorism. While the US promoted democracy it was unlikely to 
criticise Egypt for human rights transgressions as it was of too great a geopolitical value
259
. 
The push for pluralism and electoralisation by the US and IFI's did not call for democracy
260
. 
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Egypt‘s relationship with the US has had other significant effects. Referring to Ross, who 
writes about rentier affects of oil, Blaydes suggests his conclusions are applicable to rents 
gained from foreign aid. These affects are termed rentier, repression and modernisation. The 
rentier affect refers to governments collecting rents from aid being less reliant on taxes, and 
so less accountable/responsive. The repression affect refers to the ability to use aid rents to 
increase military/security forces
262
. In fact the military became an important player in the 
Egyptian economy, particularly in the manufacturing, agriculture and construction sectors
263
. 
Finally the modernisation affect refers to increased resource wealth (from aid) not 
accompanied by higher education and specialisation
264
. As Egypt suffers from an oversupply 
of young university graduates, whose skills however are not compatible with the needs of the 
economy, the above relationship between aid and its impact seems true for the Egyptian case.  
 
In conclusion 
This chapter has provided a historical narrative of Egypt‘s political landscape from the rule of 
Mohamed Ali to Hosni Mubarak‘s Presidency. There has been an emphasis on the state‘s 
domestic and international relationships, as well as the evolution of the state and its 
structures/institutions. This historical context provides the necessary foundation to apply the 
structural approach. Chapter 6 will draw heavily on the narrative provided here to explain 
‗state crisis‘ and ‗urban uprising‘. The next chapter will look at Egypt‘s opposition politics 
and protest movements, as well as providing a narrative of the period in question. 
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Chapter 4: History of opposition movements, protests/collective actions, the 
#January25th movement and events leading to the fall of Mubarak  
Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly outlines opposition and protest politics in contemporary Egypt. This 
gives insight into the re-politicisation discussed in the first chapter and illuminates important 
relationships between the state and domestic groups, which are necessary context for a 
structural approach. This is especially important when explaining how the ‗urban uprising‘ 
stage created ‗internal leverage‘ and gives insight into important ‗breakthrough‘ events.  
 
The narrative begins with a short discussion of collective actions. It then discusses secular 
opposition with an emphasis on the predecessor organisations of the #January25th movement. 
The Muslim Brotherhood and its role as the main competitor to the NDP is discussed. Finally 




Strikes and collective actions, a brief history 
 
In 1977 Sadat called on the military to suppress the bread riots or 'intifada of bread'.  The 
bread riots were led by citizens reacting spontaneously to a decrease in their standard of 
living caused by IMF subsidy cuts
265
. The police were unable to contain the unfolding events 
and Sadat called on the military to restore order. Military commander, Field Marshal el 
Gamsay, would only act to restore order if Sadat withdrew the cuts to subsidies. Cooks 
suggests that this was as a result of the military being apprehensive about public opinion, or 
being blamed by politicians if something went wrong
266
. This demonstrates how Egypt's 
incumbents were reliant on the military to remain in power. It also exhibits the importance 
that Egyptian military places on its public reputation. 
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In 1986 the Mubarak regime faced a rebellion when thousands of police conscripts went on 
the rampage in Cairo and Alexandria, citing 'slave-like conditions'. Again the army was 
called in to contain the unrest
267
, exhibiting the importance of the military in maintaining 
order and the declining legitimacy of the regime. 
 
These protests greatly affected the cost/benefit calculations that the Mubarak regime 
undertook when considering full IMF conditionality. Mubarak, in the context of the bread 
riots, was reluctant to introduce reform measures which may have created instability. Even if 






During the 1990's under emergency law (in the context of pposing radical Islamic 
movements) Mubarak mostly shut down formal politics. This subdued the leftists, Islamists 
and 'human rights community' to the point where reform politics were stagnant
269
.The next 
section addresses secular and non-secular opposition. The first section will look at civil 
society movements like Kefaya. In light of a focus on the re-politicisation of politics the 
secular section will focus on social movements and coalitions. The second section explores 
the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood as Egypt's most influential and religious 
opposition. 
 
Secular civil society: the emergence of Kefaya and beyond 
 
Kefaya was unique because it brought together activists from communist, Islamic and secular 
nationalists who had been involved in political activism since the 1970's. Kefaya
270
 (enough) 
known as the Egyptian Movement for change, began in 2004. It was not a political party and 
was not structured like one; however it drew membership from across the political 
spectrum
271
. Many Kefaya members had been jailed for their views and were well known in 
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the Egyptian and Arab media. They came together with one demand, the end of the Mubarak 
regime and the formulation of parliamentary republic with separation of powers. They stood 
firmly against Gamal Mubarak as successor of his father
272
. According to Shorbagy: ―Egypt 
needs today, more than ever, a new form of politics that pulls together diverse ideas from 




 Kefaya represents Valbjørn's notion of re-politicisation defined in the first chapter as: the 
emergence of old collective actors as well as new ones that do not necessarily participate 
within the confines of conventional political participation
274
. It also represents a departure 
from the stagnant opposition politics of the 1990's, and demonstrates that meaningful 
opposition had to come from outside of established political organisations
275
. It was an 
awakening of civil society. 
 
The rise of these social movements can be explained by cycles of protest. These cycles have 
spillover effects – they are not self-contained: they initiate other movements, work in 
conjunction with other organisations and influence the greater political and cultural context of 
the country
276
. El-Mahdi and Lim argue that Kefaya emerged out of a third wave of protests 
that began with pro-intifada mobilisations in 2000-2001
277
. These were some of the biggest 
spontaneous protests in the Arab world since the first Gulf War. In Egypt thousands of 
students demonstrated in the face of regime violence. Twenty NGO's formed the Popular 
Committee to Support the Intifada (PCSI). This led to the formation of a number of other 
organisations which provided participatory structures for activists
278
. Demonstrations in 
solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada became arenas for mobilised citizens to voice 




A second wave of protests began in 2003 against the Iraq invasion. On the 20th of March 
2003 activists called for a demonstration, over 40000 people came to Tahrir Square, it was 
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the biggest demonstration since the 1970's. Kefaya can be understood against this backdrop. 
A new form of contesting state power had been established. Protesters adapted their approach 




Kefaya had notable successes. It was the first movement to coordinate a demonstration 
openly calling for the end of the Mubarak regime and 'hereditary rule'
281
. Their success can be 
attributed to timing before the 2005 elections, and simplicity of message ‗No to inheritance, 
no to extension‘
282
. Kefaya was adept at using communication technology and social 
networks. They organised protests through text messaging and utilising blogs to disseminate 
their message
283





The decline of Kefaya can be attributed to a number of factors. In cases where the regime 
could not use co-option or division they resorted to violence. Activists who participated in 
protests were often beaten and detained without trial which was legal under emergency laws. 
Members eventually became less willing to participate in the face of state sponsored violence. 
The regime passed 'reform laws' which in fact allowed them even more scope in terms of 
violating rights, often under the guise of anti-terrorism. State controlled media eroded the 
legitimacy of the movement, painting its goals as 'daydreams' accusing it of being an agent of 
the US trying to destabilise the country. Finally it is in the interests of the ruling elite to view 
democracy as a threat to their interests. Issues like Israel's position in the region, and US 
foreign policy were spoken about in the context of 'national security' and used to defer 
attention from democratic reform
285
. This makes it hard for a movement calling for 
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Internal politics also broke Kefaya down. There was tension between secular and Islamic 
elements. A bone of contention was whether the organisation should take an anti US and 
Israel stance.  
 
The decline of Kefaya did not however deter members from continuing to blog. As police 
brutality which led to Kefaya‘s decline quashed street protest, online blogging exploded. The 
period of 2006/7 saw the Egyptian regime take note of this trend, sparking the 'War on 
Bloggers'. Police harassed and tortured many of Egypt's prominent political bloggers. This 




The first movement following Kefaya was the April 6th movement. This was the first 
movement in Egypt organised through the social networking site Facebook. It named itself 
after a general strike on April 6th 2008. It signalled solidarity between the youth mobilised by 
Kefaya and a resurgent labour movement
288
. The workers actions following the demise of 




. Connecting these civil 
youth led movements with labour was an important step toward establishing the #January25th 
movement. 
 
There has been serious strike action in Egypt since 2004. The number of collective actions 
stands at over 3000 involving more than 2 million Egyptians, which is significant because it 
outnumbered political protests over that period. Beinin et al say of the labour movement over 
this period: 'this is the largest modern labour movement in Egypt and the largest social 
movement in the Arab world since World War II'
290
. Serious strike action has occurred since 
2006 affecting most Egyptian industries. Industrial action has mostly been illegal as it has not 
been approved by the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF). These strikes have unified 
workers from across Egypt, and resulted in the formation of independent trade-union 
committees which challenged the primacy of national federations
291
. The labour movement 
would be crucial in demonstrations in early 2011; the fact that earlier ones unified workers 
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across the country is significant. Skocpol maintains that successful insurrection is only 
possible if 'peasants' can achieve widespread revolt (not just localised).  
 
Between 2006-2008 the centre of industrial actions was the textile industry in Mahalla al 
Kubra where 26000 workers went on strike. The regime dealt with strikers in a manner that 
demonstrated their eagerness not to use coercive force. The situation erupted again on April 





The labour movement has political importance because it has been a grassroots example of 
democracy. Labour movements have shown that citizens are able to come together peacefully 
to voice concerns, make demands and jointly decide on goals. A journalists‘ union for 
example elected its leadership in 2008. 3000 members publically elected leadership, one of 




The April 6th movement used the online strategies of the Kefaya Youth. They used social 
networking sites like Flickr, YouTube as well as blogs, email and text messaging. They 
added newer social networks Facebook and Twitter. Although early protests and strikes failed 
to produce participation levels hoped for, by 2009 its Facebook page had 70 000 members 
when less than 900000 Egyptians had profiles. It attracted substantial media attention and the 
state's security apparatus‘, participation in planned strikes was not as high as hoped. The 
movement's most significant impact on the #January25th movement was using Twitter to 





The advent of the social media and communication technology profoundly impacted the way 
opposition movements organise. The above clearly exhibits that social movements in Egypt 
have learnt from their predecessors, movements in other countries and benefitted from 
technological development. 
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The next section describes the development and significance of the Muslim Brotherhood as 
Egypt‘s most prominent opposition. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The Muslim Brothers society was established in 1928 as a Muslim organisation whose aims 
were to build Islamic schools and mosques and to provide basic social services. The founder 
of the Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, founded it in response to what he considered the general 
decay of Islamic values caused by Western influence
295
. According to Blaydes the current 
Muslim Brotherhood 'defies classification as it combines aspects of a religious movement, 




During the 1950's and 1960's the Brotherhood could be considered militant. They turned 
away from violence in the 1970s, at the time Sadat was balancing the leftist Nasser camp by 
courting a closer relationship with them
297
. He did this by declaring the Egyptian state one of 




The Brotherhood changed from the grassroots movement it had been at inception. During the 
1970's and 1980's it was mainly made up of wealthy businessmen allying with Sadat in order 
to take advantage of the Infitah policy
299
. The organisation returned to being a grassroots 




The Brotherhood has a history with the students/youth of Egypt. Nasser era policies have 
contributed to contemporary Egypt having many educated, but unemployed, lower-middle 
class youth. This group is referred to as the 'lumpen intelligentsia'
301
. The Brotherhood, in a 
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 During the early Sadat years, Islamic student activists successfully campaigned at Egypt's 
campuses. By the mid to late 1970's they were able to win leadership positions on student 
councils
303
.  This rising support is considered a result of the 'mosque movement' of the latter 
half of the 1970's, a reply to the mainly secular political debate in the Muslim world from the 
1950's. It considered that the Islamic way of organising daily life had been marginalised and 




The Islamic student movement's main method of campaigning was to provide socially 
oriented services to students. However the group was factionalised into a moderate Dawa 
group and more radical Jihadi group. The Brotherhood would merge with the former, a 
decision which changed its outlook on political, ideological and social views
305
. This led the 
Brotherhood back to what it had been in the 1940's, a grass roots movement appealing to the 
youth and providing services to the general population. Most importantly it began an era of 
reform for the Brotherhood by contesting regime power, taking part in elections in 




The Brotherhood did this to establish itself as a viable opposition. Elections were associated 
with Western ideals, but there was a sense of 'tactical pragmatism' involved. Elections 
provided the opportunity to disseminate the Brotherhoods message nationally
307
. Ultimately 





In the context of the withdrawal of the state from basic services, the Brotherhood has become 
more relevant. Blaydes referencing Wickham talks about 'parallel Islamic sectors'
309
. Private 
mosques, Islamic associations and businesses all provide services and goods that help provide 
the daily needs of Egyptians.  These services have cemented the Brotherhood's support 
base
310
. Providing social services launched the organisation beyond one that just appealed to 
the 'lumpen intelligentsia'. The Brotherhood managed to 'transform itself into a populist 
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political force'. Its base of appeal spread throughout impoverished neighbourhoods, mosques, 




Election campaigns were run by an extensive network of volunteers with emphasis on 
personal contact. The Brotherhood conducted regular recruitment at homes, mosques and at 
universities. They had an extensive, centralised organisational structure and established 
protest network. It often organised marches and rallies in districts where it hoped to establish 
its strength in elections'
312
. This clearly shows that the Brotherhood had the ability to organise 
and direct distinct and important groups in society.  
 
Events leading up to the #January25th Uprising 
 
The introduction of Arabic Facebook in 2009 led to a massive increase in membership, from 
900000 Egyptian members in January 2009 to almost 5 million by the end of 2010. In mid-
2010 a Facebook page called 'We are all Khaled Said' appeared after the death of a young 
blogger killed by the Egyptian Police in June 2010 because he had footage of corrupt police 
sharing the spoils of a drug bust. Pictures of his body, documenting police brutality and 
torture, flooded the web. The Facebook group became the most popular one in Egypt. From 
June to August five silent protests were organised by the group. Sharing the injustice of 
Said's death had managed to provoke a shared sense of anger and resentment towards the 
regime. The group created a collective identity for those involved, both in terms of relating to 





Khaled Said's death and the subsequent Facebook page memorialising it are a good example 
of a 'breakthrough' development which provided the opposition an opportunity to create a 
collective identity of injustice, creating the solidarity which Skocpol speaks of as creating 
‗internal leverage‘. 
 
2010 was an election year for the People's Assembly. Despite protests in the run-up period, 
elections were not free or fair. Eight people died, counting irregularities were noted, and there 
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were instances of ballot stuffing and wide spread intimidation. Opposition groups and 
movements demonstrated against election results and claimed they were illegitimate. These 
demonstrations, just before those in January 2011, were significant because they bought 




The 25th of January had been a protest date before 2011; the April 6th movement had held a 
protest on the same day in 2010 to mark police torture and brutality. The Tunisian uprising, 
just weeks before, galvanised the opposition and redirected their focus towards ousting 
Mubarak. The April 6th movement co-ordinated with the 'We are all Khaled Said' Facebook 
page and disseminated banners and video's across social networking platforms. The event 
was promoted as #January25 on Twitter
315
 as early as the 15 of January. The April 6th 
movement distributed more than 20 000 flyers and informed cab drivers about the 
#January25th protest. Cab drivers spread news about the protests almost as effectively as 




The regime seemed to be aware of the risks in light of what had happened in Tunisia. One of 
Egypt's most popular daily newspapers, Al-Ahram, reported in its English weekly just before 
the beginning of the protests that regime officials had been rubbishing reports of a Tunisian 
style uprising in Egypt. It also mentions that rumours were rife that Mubarak was meeting 




This section has provided an account of the events leading up to protests beginning on the 
25
th




This chapter provided a brief history of collective actions; secular and non-secular opposition 
groups/movements and a narrative of the events leading up to the 25
th
 of January 2011. This 
description provides insight into structural relationships between the state and domestic 
groups, as well as the context for understanding the events this paper explains from the 25
th
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of January to the 11
th
 of February 2011. The following chapter provides explores some of the 
literature on the Arab Spring in order to outline factors which have been considered causal in 

















Chapter 5: Factors in the Literature 
 
This chapter reviews literature on Egypt‘s experience of the Arab Spring with a focus on 
factors that lend understanding to how state crisis developed in Egypt and how urban uprising 
was possible. It begins with structural factors such as the contention that some regimes in the 
Middle East suffered from inherent weaknesses. Related to this is a discussion of fractures 
between the military and the Egyptian elite surrounding succession issues. The role of social 
media is also discussed. Factors such as youth unemployment; anger toward Mubarak and the 
regime; the pro-longed state of emergency and police brutality; labour polices and land 
reform reversals are discussed as reasons for grievance illuminating the motivations for 
participation in urban uprising.  
 
MENA Region Regime Weakness 
 
A factor spoken about in the literature is that some regimes under pressure in the Arab Spring 
fell because they were weaker than they appeared despite being established for long periods. 
Lynch mentions that a common theme in Middle Eastern politics was the longevity of 
regimes. According to him this was attributed to governments in the region using patronage 
systems, as well as the existence of a ‗social contract‘, which allowed the region‘s elite to 





Another theme, according to Lynch, is that there was a commonly held belief by elites that 
people were content with the status quo. Connected to this was the mistaken idea that regimes 
were internally solid and military and coercive forces were inseparable from regimes
319
. 
These beliefs were fallacious and there was significant weakness in these regimes. 
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The idea that MENA regimes, especially Egypt, were weak appeared in the literature before 
2011
320
. In 2007 Brown and Hamzawy contended Egypt was a ‗semi-authoritarian regime‘ 
more open to reform than other states in the region which could be categorised as a 
weak/failing strongly authoritarian
321
. They posit that semi-authoritarian states are those 
which have democratic institutions and practice on paper, not in reality.  
 
These regimes allow for some popular participation. Egypt has on a number of occasions, 
opened up political space. In 2002 there was an initiative to improve Human Rights by 
establishing a National Council on Human Rights. In 2005 the constitution was amended to 
allow for multi candidate elections. Reforms led to political gains by the Muslim 




Jack Goldstone contends that some regimes in the region are weaker than they appeared; 
claiming that Tunisia and Egypt are what he terms ‗sultanistic dictatorships‘. They appear 




He argues that sultanistic regime leaders extend their power in the state at the expense of 
official institutions by appealing to the fear of internal and external enemies. These leaders, 
and their elites, typically amass great amounts of wealth. They promote economic 
development to further their own wealth. Sultanistic dictators attempt to control the military 
elite by dividing them into different commands. Sultans will avoid appointing successors for 
fear that they will be replaced. Regimes have patronage relationships with populations, using 
subsidies for key goods to ‗pay their populations‘
324
. This system of patronage is combined 




Goldstone attributes weakness to the difficultly regime leaders experience when trying to 
balance self-enrichment and rewarding their elites. There is a contradictory nature of policies 
used to entrench power. By promoting education, the regime increases the number of people 
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with higher aspirations and awareness of the state‘s abuse of power and surveillance
326
. 
Subsidies weaken the regime, as the cost increases, the regime must divert increasingly more 
resources to maintain power, leading to serious strain on resources. 
  
Succession can also lead to weakness. Where there has been corruption so wide spread that it 
has alienated the regime‘s elite, dynastic succession will be blocked. Dividing the military 
also leads to weakness as military and security forces are more likely to defect during mass 
protests as there is no central authority, ideology or independent institution to maintain unity 




The next section discusses the relationship between the Egyptian military and Mubarak and 
his son Gamal. 
The Military and Gamal Mubarak 
 
Goldstone believes that in Tunisia and Egypt there were deep-seated resentments in the 
military towards both regimes. Both Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak began their careers in the 
professional military
328
. In Egypt the military has historically been closely involved in the 
local business and politics to the extent that Egypt has been ruled by former officers since 
1952. Resentment seems to have stemmed from the choice of Mubarak‘s son, Gamal as heir 
apparent. Gamal, who has never served in the military and is a banker, exerted his influence 
in business and politics through ‗business and political cronies‘ as opposed to through the 
military
329
. Lesch also notes that during the last decade Gamal has ‗sidelined the old guard‘ 




This tension between the military and Mubarak family and their circle is discussed in more 
detail in the final chapter. The next section looks at the role of social media. 
 
The role played by social and digital media 
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The Egyptian government has a history of censorship, especially when was content ‗anti–
government‘ in the mainstream media. This was historically limited to censoring radio, 
television and newspaper media, as was the case before the October 2010 elections. 




During January and February of 2011 the government moved from content censorship to 
blockage of entire web based platforms like Twitter and Facebook. On the 27
th
 of January in 
the run up to the ‗Day of Rage‘ this censorship extended to shutting down internet services 
completely, followed by SMS networks (used by organisers as a fallback when social 
networks were shut down). There was even a point on the 28
th
 of January, when the 
government shut down all mobile phone networks and some landline communication. Thus in 
the ‗Egyptian case‘, it is clear that there was a shift in government‘s censorship recognising 




One contention about the role of social media in the Arab Spring is that it is not a cause, but 
rather catalyst or accelerator of events. Stepanova claims that Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) had little or no role to play as an underlying cause of the unrest. Rather, 
long-standing socio-political and socioeconomic factors underlie the protests of the Arab 
Spring. ICT allowed for protests to happen sooner rather than later, especially in Egypt where 
protests followed quickly after those in Tunisia
333
. The social media and communication 
factor in Egypt‘s experience of the Arab Spring can be summed up as enhancing social 
mobilisation and so acting as a catalyst. 
 
A brief definition of social media is useful. Joseph quotes Kapland and Haelein's definition of 
social media: "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
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What kind of penetration/actual usage do social networks like Facebook and Twitter have in 
Egypt? According to Dunn, Facebook is by far a more important social network in Egypt in 
terms of population penetration than Twitter. In February 2011 Facebook had 3.5 million 
users as opposed to Twitter‘s relatively paltry 12000 users
335
. These numbers may seem low, 
but consider that internet users in Egypt only amount to 13.5 million people
336
. Couple this 
with the fact that according to Bhuiyan 62% of Egyptian Facebook users in 2010 were under 





Howard and Hussain look at the impact of different forms of ICT during the uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the access to these types of ICT
338
. They particularly mention 
that in the case of Tunisia online streaming video sites like YouTube, blogs and social media 
sites like Twitter and Facebook were helpful in achieving what they term ‗cognitive 
liberation‘
339
. People were able to share sympathy for Mohamed Bouazizi a street vendor in 
Tunisia who self immolated on the 17
th
 of December 2010 in protest against a small fine he 
received from an inspector and the subsequent assault and cruel treatment he received from 
security officials when he tried to appeal.
340
 Citizens were also able to see content created by 
investigative journalism that would not otherwise have been aired, exposing corruption. This 
kind of communication allowed people to network with the aim of organising and mobilising 
to bring down the regime. This being said less than 20% of the population actively used 
social media in Tunisia. Mobile SMS networks seem to have, in the Tunisian case, been more 




Egypt, by contrast has higher levels of mobile network penetration, and the biggest internet 
population in the region apart from Iran. Similar to the Tunisian experience there was also the 
‗online memorial‘ created for a symbolic victim of the Mubarak regime, blogger Khaled 
Said, who was killed on the 6
th
 of June 2010 by the Egyptian Police in retaliation for his 
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exposing corruption. This led to the Facebook page ‗We are All Khaled Said‘. According to 
Howard and Hussain, just as in the Tunisian case, this Facebook page allowed for a network 





Social media in Egypt created a forum for the communication of grievances and networking. 
Bhuiyan also claims that it was useful in enhancing the desire for democracy and socio-
economic change, as well as being a platform for idea and knowledge exchange. Social media 




Howard and Hussain maintain that civil society in Arab countries are of the belief that the 
internet, mobile phones and social media have indeed made a big difference to the outcome 
of ‗Arab Spring‘
344
. Social media built a network of people interested in furthering 




Regardless of the precise role of ICT during the uprisings, in Egypt specifically, the reaction 
of the government shows that the internet, social media and SMS networks were perceived as 
real and serious threats. Dunn posits that this can be tracked in the way the Egyptian 





The next sections look at voluntaristic factors which motivated individuals to participate in 
‗urban uprising‘ by creating grievance.  
Youth unemployment and demographic bulge 
 
The MENA region has been experiencing high rates of unemployment. The youth population, 
aged 15-29, has steadily increased
347
. According to Mara Hvistendahl Egypt has a youth 
bulge in this age group accounting for 43% of the population
348
. Since 1990 the youth 
population in Egypt has grown 65%. Education programmes have led to a larger proportion 
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of this youth receiving a university education. College enrolment has quadrupled in Egypt 
over recent decades according to Goldstone
349
. This has resulted in a large educated youth 
population without an equal increase in employment. 
 
Governments have been unable to keep job growth in line with the growth in educated youth. 
Egypt had in the past placed all college graduates in jobs; these were phased out due to cost. 
Many private sector jobs have been a means of patronage, used by elite to reward those in 
their circles. In fact in Egypt a college graduate is ten times as likely not to have a job as their 




Anger, Unchecked Power, Corruption, Labour Practices and Land 
 
Anger toward Hosni Mubarak has built in the decade before the #January25
th
 movement. The 
perception among the public was that Mubarak had accidentally come to power after Sadat‘s 
assassination in 1981. At this time he stressed the rul  of law and the necessity for 
parliamentary elections. However, as soon as he took on a second term in 1987 he began 
cementing his and the NDP‘s power. This was done by refusing constitutional reform, 
extending the state of emergency (which allowed him to use security forces to keep 




Egypt‘s long standing emergency laws have allowed for arrests without charge and indefinite 
detention
352
.  Lesch asserts Egypt‘s political system, under Mubarak, concentrated power in 
the executive. This allowed, among other privileges, the power to appoint and dismiss the 
Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, a winner takes all system at the 




Emergency laws extended by Mubarak indefinitely served to consolidate the president‘s 
absolute power. These laws allowed for, among other measures, security forces to hold 
individuals, tap their communications and search them without a warrant. Individuals could 
also be tried in Emergency State Security Courts, which were essentially military courts with 
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Corruption is pinpointed as being one of the causes of the Arab Spring; particularly in the 
case of Egypt Lesch pinpoints blatant corruption as a cause
355
. Corruption ranged from the 
widespread sale of the public sector for personal gain, to the blatant watering down of 
competition and anti-monopoly laws to ensure continued price fixing. Lesch details how 
cabinet members running for parliament used their official positions to pay for campaign 
'expenses' such as coercing votes and bribery
356
.  The corruption of the state and its elite was 
so blatant, that it was even documented by the state itself. Lesch quotes the head of a state 
investigator in the Ministry of Interior, who fled to Zurich in 2005, as having said: ―The 
Mubarak era will be known… as the era of thieves. His official business is the looting of 





A law was passed in 1992, Law 96, and implemented in 1997. Up until this point, under the 
previous Land Reform programmes, tenant farmers had inherited a permanent tenancy of 
their land. Law 96 allowed landowners to take back their land or demand any rental they saw 
fit. When the law was implemented in 1997 it led to many farming families being displaced 
and their belongings being ransacked by security forces charged with their eviction. Other 
families saw the rent on land going up tenfold. Living expenses were also pushed up further 




The Mubarak regime controlled organised labour. All public sector workers were required to 
join the ETUF which was headed by members of the NDP. Strikes were made illegal, giving 
workers no way to voice their grievances. In 2003 a law was passed which made it legal to 
hire workers on short term contracts which did not require employers to provide benefits like 
                                                 
354
 Ibid, 36 
355
 Ibid, 35-48. 
356
 Ibid, 40. 
357
 Lesch quoting the former head of an investigative unit of the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt, 42. 
358
 Lesch, ―Egypt‘s Spring,‖ 37. An impact of this policy, has been its impact on primary school enrolment. 
Families dispossessed of inherited tenancies or facing exorbitant rentals often resorted to daily wage labour. 
This would involve indenturing their young children to gain the cash wage for their labour. This led to a 















health or social insurance. The ETUF was an organisation in place to carry out the 




This chapter has presented a number of factors which have been discussed in the literature on 
the Arab Spring as either causal or significant in some way. The first three factors: regime 
weakness, the relationship between the military and regime - succession crisis and finally the 
role of social media, fit well into a structural approach in terms of state crisis creation.  
 
The remaining factors rely on agency-based explanations which associate grievance with 
causation. These explanations should not be ignored, and are valuable for consideration as 
they explain why Egyptians were so determined to rid themselves f the regime. However it 
is also apparent that structural explanations add clarity to how events in Egypt unfolded. 
There is a great deal of grievance in populations across the MENA region, structural 
approaches help to clarify the unique outcomes in different states. Actor based explanations 
clarify motivations for individual participation in the urban uprising stage of the structural 
approach. The next chapter will conclude this paper. It will apply the structural approach to 
the historical and contextual narrative provided in chapter 3 and 4 as well as factors discussed 

















Chapter 6: Analysis and Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes the paper and draws from the discussions and framework outlined in 
previous chapters.  The chapter begins with an analysis of the historical narratives of chapters 
3 and 4, in conjunction with the discussion of events from the 25th of January to the 11th of 
February 2011, in terms of the structural framework provided in chapter 2. It also draws on 
the factors discussed in chapter 5. This paper argues that Mubarak lost power because of state 
crisis arising from contradictions in the regime, particularly tensions in the elite which made 
a successful urban uprising possible. The chapter is divided into sections, one focussing on 




The structural approach discussed in chapter 2 suggests that military pressures abroad in 
conjunction with splits in the dominant class were necessary for the creation of a state crisis. 
In her assessment of the Iranian Revolution, Skocpol recognised that Iran suffered no military 
defeat, nor did it face pressure from abroad
359
. Despite this Skocpol employed a structural 
analysis to the Iranian case in terms of the 'interrelations of state, society and organised 




In terms of state crisis, Skocpol's assessment of Iran is useful. Egypt experienced no external 
military defeat, nor was it under exceptional external pressure. Despite this the Egyptian case 
can still be analysed, as was the Iranian one, in terms of structural conditions which produce a 
state crisis and significant social/political change. 
 
The following sections explain state crisis in terms of external pressures and the 
contradictions they created, tensions in the elite and the military‘s motivation to act as it did. 
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This section describes external pressures. The first comes from the US's policy on democracy 
in the MENA region. An explanation of elections and their function in Egypt is important. 
According to Blaydes elections in Egypt are a means of distributing state resources to 
politically influential groups (businessmen, party apparatchik and politically influential 
classes)
361
. Access to parliamentary seats is valuable because of political and legal immunity 
that comes with them.  The state's relationship with members of the elite is one of clientalistic 
patronage, the state gives 'membership' in return for support. Blaydes citing Tripp: 
  
―In Egypt, there exists a series of reinforcing political and economic ties between the 
regime and the elite. Channels of patronage 'filter down' from the president and 





The role of the elite is to provide regimes with stability
363
. Elite unity is present when there is 
consensus on the rules/codes of political participation. The elite should also have a vision or 
purpose which they agree on. Meisel referred to the three c‘s, elite consciousness, coherence 
and conspiracy (‗common will to action‘).  If an elite does not act in a unified manner, it is 
more a group of ‗top persons‘, than an elite.  Cohesiveness is considered to be the primary 




Mubarak and Sadat shifted their support base from the amma (public) to the khassa 
(privileged). Considering that Mubarak's regime at the time of the #January25th uprisings 
was appealing to the elite as its basis of support, tensions in this group could have caused a 
state crisis. 
 
If 'membership' of a regime (by means of benefits/perks) is an incentive to take part in 
elections, and if the elite are important for stability, then the manner in which elections are 
conducted and resources distributed becomes important. Election campaigns are not paid for 
by the NDP, members of the elite pay for their own campaigns. This makes regular, 'fair' 
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elections for elite to compete in important
365
. Individuals paying for campaigns may feel 
'cheated' if elections do not provide a fair arena for competition. Blaydes, citing Young's 
contends: 
 
―As members of the political elite pursue their careers, conflict over access to state 
resources has the potential to destroy the incumbent's coalition of support. Thus, 
equity, particularly the consistent application of norms for distribution of some set of 




―Elections allow the regime to manage distributive expectations for Egypt's rent-
seeking elite, particularly with the regard to the distribution of power, promotions, 
rents, access to state resources, and immunity from criminal prosecution for corrupt 
practices. In this way, elections provide a well-structured environment for elite 




Egypt's relationship with the US (and IMF), has come with conditionality
368
. During the 
Mubarak era, the biggest constraint on executive authority has come from these external 
donors, and has affected Egyptian foreign and domestic policy
369
. The decision to amend 
article 76 of the Egyptian constitution, to show greater electoralisation, as opposed to 
democratisation, as the latter would weaken the regime
370
. Democracy in the Middle East is a 
goal of US foreign policy following the September 11th terrorist attacks. In 2002 a new US 
aid doctrine was introduced focussing funding on democracy promotion.  Blaydes contends 
that during a meeting in 2004 Bush made it clear to Mubarak that he would have to win the 
presidency in a multi-candidate election, to show Egypt's commitment to democratisation. To 
continue benefitting from aid, Mubarak announced amendments to the constitution allowing 
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Far from liberalising the political process, the Mubarak regime was 'institutionalising a 
dominant party succession scenario'
372
. The new institutional design afforded the NDP more 
power in elections, and a move away from 'personalist and military influences'
373
. Blaydes 
argues that the US pressure to democratise encouraged the Mubarak regime to adopt a 




Blaydes further suggests: 
 
 ―Once in place, multicandidate elections are unlikely to be rescinded, and, if the 
ruling party splits over the selection of a nominee, this could create the type of 




U.S. pressure has had a significant structural effect. Pushing for greater democratisation has 
indirectly led to the Mubarak regime to construct electoral institutions which favoured 
Gamal's succession. As Blaydes demonstrates disagreement over succession within the NDP 
would cause a split in the elite. A later section discusses Gamal Mubarak's path to succession 
as leading to tensions within the elite by side stepping elections as a mechanism for elite 
management.  
 
In terms of other external pressures, regional competition dating back to the Nasser era 
played a role in establishing contradictions in the old regime. Nasser positioned Egypt to be a 
regional leader, while at the same time competing with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Israel. 
Against this backdrop Nasser 'modernised' and reformed Egypt. Rather than form an alliance 
with the West to prevent Soviet influence/hegemony he believed development was key. 
Heikal contends: ―Nasser felt that the answer to communist infiltration did not lie in joining 
Western sponsored alliances with their imperialist overtones but rather in promoting internal 
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Reforms to education and the institution of a vast welfare system are good examples of these 
development projects. These policies created the large educated but unemployed youth, and 
established subsidies for basic consumer goods which would prove problematic to remove. 
These led to long term structural impact when Sadat and Mubarak tried to move towards 
more neoliberal policies and from the public to the elite as a basis of support.   
 
The relationship between US aid the Egyptian military has been established. Egypt receives 
$1.3 billion annually and its military is a major benefactor of this
377
. Aid, in conjunction with 
the role the military plays in the economy already, strengthens its position in society. It also 




 Break in the elite: succession crisis 
 
The previous section demonstrated external pressures contributing to state crisis. It suggested 
that circumvention of election norms may have lead to conflict in the elite. It also contended 
if the choice of successor was unpopular it could c use tension in the elite. This section 
explores this argument in more detail. 
 
Egyptian leaders traditionally come from military backgrounds, Gamal Mubarak does not. 
Before his entrance into politics, he had a lucrative career working for Bank of America 
(BofA) where it is claimed he used his position as the president's son to illicit unfair 
profits
379
. In the mid 1990's Gamal left his position at BofA and returned to Cairo from 
London, in 1996
380




As Hosni Mubarak‘s age became noticeable in the late 1990's, conjecture about succession 
picked up momentum. Mubarak never tipped a successor
382
; there was no vice-president as he 
wanted to avoid competition
383
. Two candidates were likely, General Omar Suleiman, the 
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chief of the General Intelligence Directorate, at the centre of military succession scenarios 
and Gamal Mubarak
384
. Mubarak's son, Gamal, was considered to have the edge over 
Suleiman. It was rumoured Gamal was being positioned to take over as president. When 
Article 76 of the constitution was changed again in 2007, speculation was that changes had 




Gamal was packaged as a champion of the youth. The creation of the Future Generation 
Foundation was what initially gave rise to the idea he was being groomed for succession, it 
was suspected it had been created as a platform
386
. In 2000 he joined the NDP General 
Secretariat, and in 2002 became the head of its Policy Secretariat, the centre of decision 
making power. While the Secretariat had 200 members, power was wielded by a small circle 
close to Gamal. He positioned himself to be viewed as a reformer, of both the party and 
economy. Within months of taking the new position, Gamal was rumoured to be more 
powerful, than the Prime Minister. Gamal and his circle were taking control of the reins of 




From 2004 Gamal went on a number of trips to the US meeting with the Bush administration, 
on a level beyond his position if the notion of being groomed for succession was removed. 
Domestically there were efforts to develop an image of a statesman. He travelled around 





Gamal surrounded himself with well educated, successful elites. There was a sense that some 
members enjoyed the power and influence they did because of their ties to Gamal. Cook 
highlights Hossam Badrawi, who was closely associated with Gamal, and despite his loss of a 
People's Assembly seat to an 'old guard' elite, he retained positions of power and influence in 
the Shura Council. Similarly Mohammed Kamal, 'burst onto the Egyptian political scene' in 
2004 also as a result of his association with Gamal. He was a key member of Gamal's elite 
                                                 
384
 Ibid, 204-205. 
385
 Ibid, 202. 
386
 Zahid, The Muslim, 130-131. 
387
 Ibid, 131. 
388















calling for 'European' style economic and political reform
389
. This occurred in the context of 




These new elites circumvented regularised routes to power, through elections. They enjoyed 
the benefits of power through their personal connections to Gamal, flouting the norms 
established to distribute resources and power through elections. Even when members of his 
elite lost elections in the People's Assembly, they still held onto power and prestige that other 
members of the old guard had to pay for. Apart from sidelining the old elite, there was a 
sense that those associated with Gamal's path to succession came to their positions with 





Members of the 'old guard' NDP elite were also concerned by the liberalisations, specifically 
the move to a floating exchange rate, which they believed would have negative social 
impacts
392
.  They were correct, floating the currency led to a bread shortage and demonstrated 
how deeply unpopular Gamal‘s reforms were. This emphasis on neo-liberal economic 
policies was an example of ‗transnational events‘ – the world capitalist market shaping the 
new generation of elites and their beliefs. It also is an example of how the elite had differing 
visions of their role and the future of the country. Gamal and his circle aimed for economic 





Hosni Mubarak made sure that his son's newly found power in Egyptian politics was assured. 
In 2004 he reshuffled the cabinet in his son's favour. The cabinet, previously dominated by 
the old-guard, was now 'studded' with young, Western educated individuals
394
 demonstrating 
power distribution through connection to Gamal. 
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Opposition to Gamal as successor began when Dr Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who had taught 
Gamal and the first lady, began asking whether succession was reasonable in the context of 
the rhetoric about a transition to democracy. He was arrested in mid 2000 and served time in 
prison. Similarly Ayman Nour and his political party also challenged the regime and the 
legitimacy of a succession scenario. He was also sent to prison in 2005
395
. He argued that 





There was also general opposition succession. Bloggers chronicled protests against a Gamal 
succession in 2004. This sparked a larger response in the blogosphere, as commentary and 
documentation of the brutal and predatory nature of the state flooded the web
397
. Beyond 
opposition in the 'blogosphere' there were a number of protests organised by organisations 
like Kefaya, specifically to highlight the issue of hereditary rule
398
. Protests against the 




The media, especially newspapers, have been incredibly critical of Gamal. Many suggested 
that Mubarak had framed Gamal as the only alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood when 
dealing with the US
400
.  A succession scenario involving Gamal Mubarak was deeply 
unpopular with the Muslim Brotherhood, student movements, secular opposition movements 
and significantly elements within the military and the security forces
401
. The military had 
since the Sadat era been uninvolved in politics. They did however have increasing interests in 
the economy with everything from agri-business to house wares, and benefitted from US aid. 
 
The military as final guarantor 
 
How has the regime maintained its power vis-a-vis the frustrated and angry population? 
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Power in Egypt is mainly maintained by repression and co-option. The Ministry of the 
Interior had 'hundreds of thousands of special police and security agents'
402
. Even though 
coercive force used against journalists and activists, has not always muted opposition, other 




 'Low intensity democracy' kept a lid on a nation experiencing an ever increasing inequality 
gap. In 1991 the poorest 10% of the population had access to 3.9% of the country's income; 
ten years later the same group had access to 3.7%. In that same period Egypt's richest 20% 
had gained from 26.7% to 29.5% of national income
404
. Class relations in Egypt have 
changed drastically over the Mubarak years. The widening gap between rich and poor is 
symptomatic of clientalistic relationships between the state and upper/business classes, while 
withdrawing from the arena of social service provision
405
. This is important in terms of 
Skocpol's contention that relevant tensions in society are between the dominant and 





In terms of legitimacy, rather than considering elections in Egypt as a means of gaining 
legitimacy, one can consider them a tool to manage a state's domestic elite
407
. Skocpol's view 
of legitimacy, that it is not as powerful an explanatory variable when looking at causes of 
state crises, fits well with the view of elections. Legitimacy is important for politically 
powerful groups, the loss of it is not, if said group has the means to remain in power by 
coercive force. Basic causes of revolutionary situations can be found in the structure and 
capacity of the state. This reasserts the idea of 'old regime' contradictions. This places 
legitimacy in the position of intervening variable. It is still important in this analysis, but not 
in terms of the creation of a state crisis
408
. What is important is the ability to coerce. 
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Cook argues that the strength of a state can be thought about in terms of the ability to 'elicit 
the compliance of their citizens'. He suggests that normative appeals (such as the 'American 
dream'), patronage and finally coercion can be used to elicit compliance. In Egypt, normative 
appeals have failed. This leaves the use of bribery and coercion to ensure social cohesion. 
Egypt's resources are finite and the Mubarak regime has used patronage in order to ensure the 





The power to keep Mubarak in office was in the hands of the military. Why did they choose 
not to support the regime? The position of the military during the first two and a half weeks 
of the unrest in early 2011 was mostly unclear at the time. During this period Barany argues 
that the military was hedging its bets, trying to secure its position with the ruling government 




By February 2nd, Mubarak had attempted to use coercive force against demonstrators, in the 
form of pro-regime thugs; a key turning point was reached with soldiers moving to the side of 
the protesters. Promised concessions, and attempts at repression by Mubarak had both failed 
to break up protests. In this context the military believed that escalating violence on their part 
would only decrease their legitimacy and influence in the situation
411
. On the 10th of 
February a reluctant SCAF took over control of the country, and the next day convinced 




Explaining the military's decision not to support the regime 
 
The dislike of Gamal Mubarak and his succession is one reason the military did not support 
Mubarak. Mistrust was based on the fact that Gamal had the interests of himself and the 
young business elite he associated with as his top priority. Other reasons that Barany gives 
for the military not supporting Mubarak include: the alienation of Egypt's youth (by his 
policies), the possibility of encouraging Islamic radicalism as an alternative, stagnating 
economy, resentment at the favour and largesse of the security forces in relation to the 
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military and finally as a conscript army the actual soldiers in the military, who would have 




Albrecht and Bishara maintain that even though the military had been absent from politics it 
was the critical backbone of the regime. This was in the sense that the ultimate coercive force 
available to the regime was the military. It also importantly acted as a recruitment pool for 





The military was deployed on the 28th of January after security forces were withdrawn in the 
wake of bloody street battles with protesters. The security forces had, according to Albrecht 
and Bishara suffered an 'internal meltdown', in the wake of the torching of the NDP offices in 
Cairo
415
. This is significant because security services in Egypt had become the main 
administrative arm of the state, conducting a number of important administrative tasks
416
. 
Their breakdown thus signified the collapse of administrative and coercive force of the state, 
both central to Skocpol's conception of state power. 
 
Following this on the 31st of January, the military stated they supported the legitimate 
demands of the protesters. However it was only by the 10th of February the SCAF Generals 
met without the president. According to Albrecht and Bishara this signals that they were 




February 10th and 11th marked the days the military took over the political institutions of 
Egypt and pushed Mubarak from office. A central question in the Egyptian case is why did 
the military become involved in politics when it was apparent they were reluctant to do so? 
Why not choose to support the regime? 
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Factors have been mentioned explaining why the military may have been reluctant to support 
Mubarak. Yet they appeared reluctant to push him from power. The use of some theory of 
how the military acts in politics is useful. Albrecht and Bishara use Finer's framework which 
includes looking at opportunity and disposition in order to explain military intervention. They 
argue that the military initially had strong opportunity to displace the regime but their 
disposition to intervene was low. This disposition changed over the course of events and 





The military had, until the 10th of February 2011, very little interest in being involved in 
politics, largely because they had maintained a mostly positive relationship with the 
population since the 1973 battle with Israel. Chapter 4 demonstrated the importance of 
positive public perception to the military. They also had secure economic interests, and the 
ability to influence politics as they were in control of coercive force, and had traditionally, 
been a pool from which powerful members of elite were drawn. Thus their main imperative 




Albrecht and Bishara argue that the relationship between the military and regime had been 
strained for some time over Gamal‘s succession and reform policies. The military preferred 
the economic policies of the Nasser era, namely etatism
420
. They also disliked the 'crony 




Between the 28th of January and the 10th of February, Albrecht and Bishara argue that the 
military's perception changed. They began to see themselves as servants of the state, and not 
the Mubarak regime
422
. As the regime and its institutions were crumbling, and with them the 
favourable position of the military, a choice about whom to support became apparent. Rage at 
Mubarak's refusal to step down on February 10th had led to a march by protesters to the 
Presidential palace
423
. This put the military in a position where it would directly have to 
choose between the regime and protesters, especially if demonstrators tried to gain access. 
The military could continue to support the regime, whose institutions were in shambles, and 
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with which it had existing tensions. This would come at a cost, as it enjoyed a positive 
relationship with the public. Or it could increase its disposition to take control of the political 
institutions of state itself and protect its interests. 
 
Complementary to Finer's framework is Alfred Stepan's explanation of how the military 
becomes a 'director' instead of a 'moderator' in a country's political system
424
. Stepan 
describes how the military in Brazil became involved as a 'director' of the political system as 
a result of 'the atmosphere of crisis that dominated Brazil from 1962 to 1964'. Certain 'trends' 
regarding the regime's capacity and ability within the political system led to a sense of 
structural crisis
425
. Stepan argues the 'civil-military' relationship in Brazil changed as a result 
of the perception of the capability of the regime to meet the demands it was faced with in the 
context of the declining legitimacy
426
.  The military became a 'director' in the political 
system, as opposed to a 'moderator', when it became apparent the regime was no longer able 
to meet the challenges it faced. This fits in with Finer's analysis, the military in Egypt had the 
opportunity to take control of the political system on the 28th of January, yet it waited until 
the 10th to do so. Its disposition to do so progressed as it became increasingly apparent that 





A further argument by Stepan could also explain the military's actions. The military in Brazil 
felt threatened as an institution and was hostile towards 'mobilisation politics', which 
threatened its situational integrity. This perceived threat eroded its position as moderator
428
. 
Stepan views the military in a similar fashion as he would a political institution, subject to 
similar pressures from society
429
. If we think of the military in Egypt in this sense it is 
reasonable to argue that the Egyptian military intervened when it felt the situation had 
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deteriorated to point that it was threatening its own institutional survival and autonomy. The 
Egyptian military may have been hostile towards the Mubarak regime's alienation of it in 
picking Gamal, a non-military member as a successor. The military was also hostile toward 
the regime's new economic policies. Finally, where the Egyptian military had been a pool 
from which the regime picked its leaders and bureaucrats, the Mubarak family was 
increasingly interpersonalising power. Instead of drawing from the military pool for top 
positions in the elite, the Mubaraks were increasingly drawing on Gamal's circle of influence 
to fill top positions. This may have threatened the military institution in terms of its 
importance and centrality in the political system. This fits well with Goldstones contention, in 
Chapter 5 that Arab leaders were extending their own power at the risk of official institutions 
and that this was a cause of their overthrow. 
 
'Urban uprising': a crisis from below 
 
According to the structural approach we know peasant insurrections are viable because they 
coincide with and take advantage of lack of government control, resulting from political 
crisis.
430
 Skocpol‘s analysis of the Iranian revolution in terms of its insurrection by mainly 
urban masses focuses on the factors which create solidarity and allow co-ordination. 
 
Important for a structural approach is ‗what transforms the peasantry, into a collective force 
capable of striking out against its oppressors‘.  In this regard 'internal leverage', the capacity 
for organised protests, is important. This is influenced by solidarity and the ability to escape 
coercive control of the state
431
. In terms of the #January25 movement, we can look at the role 
played by organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which we have established has an 
existing network of communication, organisation and social service provision networks that 
were important during the uprising.  
 
In terms of establishing solidarity and co-ordination, it has been established how the 
#January25th movement grew out of waves of protests beginning in 2000. These waves 
included increasingly more activists, politicians and concerned citizens. They eventually 
included workers who then linked their grievances to the regime. The April 6
th
 Movement, 
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symbolised increasing solidarity between activists and labour movements. As mentioned, 
towards the latter half of the #January25th demonstrations there were rolling strikes in 
support of the protests happening all over the country. 
 
More broadly, in terms of co-ordination and solidarity, social media connected and organised 
an otherwise fractured movement. The inclusion of Facebook and Twitter were central in the 
ability firstly of activists to create a shared identity in terms of victimisation by the state. The 
best example is the creation and impact of the 'We are all Khaled Said' Facebook page. 
Secondly, social media, specifically Twitter, made co-ordination not only widely possible but 
more efficient. Skocpol states any structural approach should make reference to world 
historic developments
432
. The advent of the internet, but also social media as an externality of 
it, is possibly the most important world historic development for the case in question. It is 
important because it opens up a means for citizens, whether in rural or urban settings, to 
communicate and co-ordinate. Other 'breakthrough' moments were the release of Wael 
Ghonim and the creation of the 'We are all Khaled Said' Facebook page as well as Google‘s 
Speak2Tweet creation, which allowed protesters to use Twitter despite government 
communication blackouts. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider how protesters overcame state repression which has 
successfully been used in the past. As mentioned in Chapter 4 there have been widespread 
instances of uprising in the past, for example the bread riots and security services uprising, 
however in both of these cases the military, after negotiation with the regime, stepped in to 
restore order. The structural approach emphasises the ability of the peasants to protest or 
rebel without coercive force being used against them. The Mubarak regime certainly did use 
its security forces and hired thugs against its citizen's, but was unable to use the military. 
Cook asserts that once the use of hired thugs on the 2nd and 3rd of February failed, in the 
wake of the meltdown of police and intelligence forces, that the only thing which would have 
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This paper asked: how does the structuralist approach explain the fall of Mubarak, including 
the role of the military in contributing to this outcome? A secondary question was: How did 
the #January25 Movement come to be and sustain itself throughout the abovementioned time 
period? Central to answering these was understanding why the military did not step in to help 
Mubarak maintain power and how the #January25th movement was able to co-ordinate and 
sustain itself. In the context of moving away from the narrow focus of the democratisation 
literature, this paper chose to use a structural approach based on Skocpol's work. This 
structural approach was useful for analysing significant social change, and provided as 
Valbjørn and Bank put it, new wine in old bottles. It required that three main principles be 
taken into account. Firstly that states were thought of as administrative/coercive organisations 
which were possibly autonomous from dominant classes. Secondly a focus on non-voluntarist 
and structural explanations of causes and processes was required. Finally international 
structures and historic developments should also be taken into account. Classic elite theory 
has also been discussed, specifically the notion of unity. This was done to better understand 
elite dynamics and what may lead to tensions or breaks in the elite, and thus state crisis. 
 
The aim of chapters 3 and 4 was to provide the contextual background needed to achieve this. 
Chapter 3 focussed on the political narrative focussing on the formation of the state and its 
domestic and international relationships. It established how and when policies, which would 
later become contradictory, were initiated and why. Chapter 4 looked at Egypt's opposition, 
including social protest movements since 2000 and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Chapter 5 investigated literature on the Arab Spring with a focus on highlighting factors 
which were considered causal, or in some way significant. There were a number of factors 
which could be considered structural, including the view that Egypt was a ‗sultanistic‘ regime 
– which had inherent weaknesses because of methods employed to stay in power. There was 
also the view that the military‘s relationship with regime was strained over the issue of 
succession, particularly that it disliked Gamal Mubarak as successor. These factors contribute 
to the understanding of how state crisis formed. It also discussed factors which could be 
considered agency based, such as anger at the regime over emergency laws, police brutality, 
corruption etc. These are indeed valuable in an analysis of what has caused such wide-spread 
















This final chapter has used the contextual background in chapter from chapters 3, 4 and the 
factors mentioned in chapter 5 to apply the framework described in chapter 2. It finds firstly 
that external pressure may have played a role in establishing contradictions in the Mubarak 
regime. Regional competition in the Nasser era led to grand development programmes 
including universal tertiary education and numerous subsidies which became fiscally 
unsound, but politically impossible to remove. USAID strengthened the position of the 
military, making it a more powerful player in the state. 
 
U.S. pressure to democratise led perversely to greater electoralisation. This led to a situation 
where Gamal Mubarak was being groomed for succession through multi-candidate elections. 
Once in place they were unlikely to be rescinded, and the choice of who would succeed was 
likely to have cause tension in the elite. As has been demonstrated the military in particular 
was unhappy with the choice of Gamal. A number of authors mention this as the reason they 
did not intercede to help Hosni Mubarak remain in power. Related to Gamal's rise as 
successor was the possible resentment felt by the old guard elite. Gamal's close circle of 
associates rose to power outside the established system of elections as a means of resource 
distribution by the state to the elite. 
 
The Military's decision not to act in favour of Mubarak was also explored in more detail. This 
paper argued that although the military had the opportunity to take over from the 28th of 
January they only did so later on the 10th and 11th when their disposition to increased. This 
happened when their choices were narrowed by Mubarak's refusal to step down, paired with 
the demonstrators marching on the presidential palace. Putting the military in a situation 
where they would inevitably have to choose, if the protesters began scaling the walls for 
example. Alfred Stepan's work was also used. He argues that the military moves from 
moderator to director of politics when it appears that the regime is no longer capable of 
meeting the challenges it faces, and there is an 'air' of structural crisis. He further argues that 
the military will step in to maintain its institutional integrity. As was argued above the 
security services had crumbled by the 28th of January, they were the main coercive and 
administrative arm of the state (importantly the structural approach views the power of the 
state as coming from its coercive and administrative capacity). Furthermore, it has been 















institutions. If the military as an institution with significant interests to protect, felt threatened 
by this, they would be less likely to intervene on his behalf. 
 
In terms of elite unity common values, interests and a shared vision are important. The 
Mubarak regime and the military increasingly displayed diverging values (views on 
economic policy) and interests (as the military was ‗sidelined‘). Furthermore norms and rules 
of resource distribution, by means of elections, were increasingly being sidelined by personal 
relations to Gamal Mubarak. Both these factors potentially led to a break in the elite, and 
contributed to state crisis. 
 
Finally this chapter discussed how an urban insurrection from below was possible. The 
#January25th movement was ultimately successful because it was able to take advantage of 
the state crisis and the lack of coercive control. The structural approach views wide-spread 
collective action as an important factor, influenced by solidarity. Chapter 4 established how 
waves of protest since 2000 have involved increasingly more activists and sectors of society, 
putting aside differences and uniting with the purpose of removing Mubarak from power.  
The #January25th movement also benefited from networks of social provision provided by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the coordination and common identity made possible by social 
media.  
 
It is clear that the structural approach together with insights from classic elite theory have 
been useful in addressing the questions raised by this paper. Mubarak, a seemingly strong 
leader was vulnerable as a result of contradictions in his regime, which among others 
included alienating the military by grooming his son for succession, which helps explain why 
they did not support him. It also explains why the #January25th movement was sustained and 
successful, significantly in terms of its ability to collectively organise using social media and 
established networks of solidarity built over a decade of 'protest waves'. It also looks at the 
impact of 'breakthrough' moments on the movement like the advent of social media, the 
release of Wael and the invention of ‗Speak2Tweet‘. Ultimately a structural framework 
allows for an understanding of events which is historical and contextual both in terms of 
domestic dynamics and international influences. It suggests that just like Agrarian 
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